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Abstract 
  This dissertation examines how phenomena of recomposition relate to notions of literacy 
sponsorship. Several examples I examine demonstrate explicit practices of composing for 
strategic recomposition (Ridolfo and DeVoss 2009), such as retailer Babeland’s recruitment of 
Facebook users to spread its brand name and sex-positive ideology to potential consumers; social 
activist clementine cannibal’s recruitment of grrrls to spread feminist ideology throughout their 
virtual and geopolitical communities; and the National Institute of Mental Health (NIMH) and 
Center for Disease Control’s (CDC) recruitment of reporters, bloggers, and social network users 
to prevent the spread of suicide contagion. As digital technologies and networks have 
increasingly facilitated methods for recomposing and recirculating texts as consumer-producers, 
the study of sponsorship as a phenomenon that structures channels for information distribution 
and that acts upon those who consume sponsored writers’ texts has gained in importance. 
However, my study of interactions between text-promoters and their sharers and of a series of 
outbreak narratives portraying the circulation of popular or purportedly dangerous texts uncovers 
the inadequacies of existing frameworks—top-down sponsorship, memetics, and virality—for 
conceptualizing the production and spread of texts. These constructions, I find, frequently reduce 
complex social relations to analogical models that portray sponsored writers, text-sharers, and 
readers as acted upon, afflicted, or otherwise interpellated. I argue that rather than simply 
describing or even illuminating systems of compositional activity, these conceptual frameworks 
can operate to favor producers who wish to efface their involvement in promoting certain 
interests and that richer understandings of compositional participation are required to recover 
participants’ agency within the necessarily collaborative activities of circulating composition. 
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Chapter One 
Introduction 
 
    Every day, I open my email to find pitches from numerous social and political causes 
soliciting not simply my funds or my vote but my writing and my “voice.” Wildlife Emergency 
Services asks me to sign a petition1 pledging not to purchase Yoplait yogurt, whose discarded 
funnel-shaped cups pose a danger to animals. The NGO Avaaz asks for my written support in 
creating a public relations disaster for Italian clothing company Benetton in order to pressure 
them into compensating survivors of a collapse in their eight-story sweatshop in Bangladesh.  
Planned Parenthood asks me to write to my representatives to support or protest bills that could 
be passed into law. What these requests have in common is their call for many voices to spread 
the same message. Planned Parenthood, for example, declares the need for a “chorus of 
opposition” to unfavorable policies, and it is not enough that I lend my digital signature; I must 
broadcast the proposition as well: “Help us today by sharing this with just ONE friend to spread 
the word! Click here to SHARE with a friend!”; “Share this email with your mom, your sister, 
your neighbor!”; “Tell your friends on Facebook and Twitter!” To these ends, Planned 
Parenthood and many other organizations often provide scripted text for me to pass on, with 
directions such as, “Use this note in your own e-mail or Facebook page,” and motivation that 
ironically declares, “Your voice makes a difference.” This dissertation interrogates the 
entailments of metaphors2 currently used as conceptual tools for understanding the role of the 
social in these processes of recomposition. How can we understand processes of promoting the 
spread of specific messages, the activity of passing along texts prompted or even scripted by 
another, and the interactions between those promoting the spread of such texts and those they 
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recruit to circulate them? How do certain understandings of texts’ circulation favor, prioritize, or 
facilitate some rhetorical goals over others, and at the expense of which interests?  
  Within scholarship in writing studies, the trope of literacy sponsorship appears as the 
most salient conceptual framework for making legible how ideological—and especially 
economic—interests are transacted through processes and products of literate activity. Deborah 
Brandt identifies sponsors of literacy as “any agents, local or distant, concrete or abstract, who 
enable, support, teach, model, as well as recruit, regulate, suppress, or withhold literacy—and 
gain advantage by it in some way” (1998, p. 166; 2001, p. 19). Despite Brandt’s (2001) 
identification of sponsors as operating in a variety of forms, including social institutions; public 
infrastructure; and communication technologies, subsequent studies of literacy sponsorship have 
focused on person-centered views of sponsorship, often starting with writers’ own accounts of 
their work; their personal experiences; and the individuals who have shaped their writing (see 
Selfe and Hawisher’s (2004) study of computer-related literacy and Sara Webb-Sunderhaus’s 
(2007) research on immediate and extended family members’ sponsorship of students in Central 
Appalachia). While such studies productively examine the relationship of literacy to those 
instructed or otherwise enabled, regulated, or constrained in reading or writing, my dissertation 
argues for an object of inquiry beyond sponsored writers as an approach to the study of literacy 
sponsorship. For the purposes of this project, I interrogate sponsorship as a phenomenon that 
structures channels for information distribution and that acts upon those who consume sponsored 
writers’ texts. I focus my object of study on channels of information with the goal of achieving 
richer understandings of how sponsorship shapes the consumption of texts, particularly as digital 
technologies and networks allow for increasingly faster and easier methods for recomposing and 
recirculating texts as consumer-producers.  
  3 
  Throughout my dissertation, I examine how phenomena of recomposition relate to 
notions of sponsorship. Several examples demonstrate explicit practices of composing for 
strategic recomposition (Ridolfo and DeVoss 2009), such as retailer Babeland’s recruitment of 
Facebook users to spread its brand name and sex-positive ideology to potential consumers; social 
activist clementine cannibal’s recruitment of grrrls to spread feminist ideology throughout their 
virtual and geopolitical communities; and the National Institute of Mental Health (NIMH) and 
Center for Disease Control’s (CDC) recruitment of reporters, bloggers, and social network users 
to prevent the spread of suicide contagion. Specifically, I focus on retailer Babeland’s 
recruitment of Facebook users to spread its brand name and sex-positive ideology to potential 
consumers; social activist clementine cannibal’s recruitment of grrrls to spread feminist ideology 
throughout their virtual and geopolitical communities; and the National Institute of Mental 
Health (NIMH) and Center for Disease Control’s (CDC) recruitment of reporters, bloggers, and 
social network users to prevent the spread of suicide contagion. In each of these examples, 
sponsors (and processes of sponsorship) actively recruit composition and recomposition from 
writers who have social networks to which the sponsors seek access to circulate their messages.  
  I have selected these sites of study to illuminate a process I identify as dislocated 
sponsorship. In the examples I study, I see a commonality that reminds me of the Wizard of Oz; 
sponsors recruit writers to mediate their messages to audiences so that the readers pay no 
attention to the man behind the curtain, or the actual sponsoring interests behind the messages 
they consume. I propose the concept of dislocated sponsorship in part to help us in analyzing 
persuasive strategies of getting voices that do not seem to share sponsors’ interests to propagate 
them, such as television characters involved in product placement who do not explicitly 
announce, “This scene is brought to you by Coca Cola” to credit those underwriting their media. 
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For the purposes of this project, it helps us to recognize Babeland’s interest in driving 
enthusiasm for its products from consumers rather than its paid staff; grrrlVIRUS’s interest in 
creating a collective by de-emphasizing clementine cannibal’s role as creator of movement; and 
NIMH and the CDC’s shared interests in creating the impression of universal truth by directing 
reporters to insert material directly from their guidelines into their writings on suicide. Recruiting 
writers with an audience allows these sponsors not only to amplify their messages but also to 
shape how their messages are received. By channeling the messages through more voices and 
ones that are not its own, the sponsor gains credibility, whether through seemingly more 
trustworthy voices or in apparent consensus. The more such voices are recruited and induced to 
speak, the more the message resounds and the more likely it is to become a social fact, with no 
apparent author or origin.3 Beyond these processes, however, I further consider how invoking 
tropes of viral spread might function to dislocate sponsorship, to make the principal interests 
beyond a message less obvious, more difficult to identify. In working to obscure the top-down 
action of teaching, regulating, ventriloquizing through, and suppressing individuals in literate 
activity, the process of dislocated sponsorship often calls attention to flatter processes of spread 
not typically theorized in current studies of sponsorship.  
  Brandt’s portrayal of sponsorship is largely that of macro-social powers acting upon 
sponsored readers and writers. Her definition of sponsorship as enabling, supporting, teaching, 
modeling, recruiting, regulating, suppressing, or withholding literacy epitomizes this vertical 
action with a long series of top-down verbs portraying its parameters of action. I work to add 
horizontal dimensions to the vertically oriented metaphor of sponsorship in two ways. I first 
build on Webb-Sunderhaus’s (2007) and Pavia’s (2013) work on competing and complementary 
sponsorships, by examining the intersecting action of multiple sponsors upon sponsored writers, 
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introducing the terms confluent sponsorship and composite sponsorship. Confluent sponsorship, 
as the term suggests, involves sponsors with confluent interests, such as social network 
Facebook’s interest in aggregating consumers in one site to sell advertising space and retailers 
interest in making their products and brands visible in a space with not only an amassed audience, 
but personal data frequently available to target specific populations that meet their target 
demographics. Throughout this study, I examine networks of sponsors that interact without 
explicitly conspiring with one another to reach their goals, rather than the more typical study of 
sponsorship by individuals or organizations. By taking up the channels of information 
distribution and textual recomposition that the social network site Facebook and users such as 
retailer Babeland create for affiliate users within the network, I outline a process I term 
composite sponsorship, in which the synergy of multiple sponsors (whether confluent or not) 
results in structural significance and ideological freight distinct from those that result from the 
operation of any single sponsor on its own. As multiple sponsors intersect, I find that the 
structure of who is sponsoring whom becomes less clear, as Facebook sponsors Babeland’s 
literate activity even as Babeland recruits its own body of writers, and Babeland and its affiliates 
recruit each other in constructing their digital identities within Facebook’s social network. While 
Babeland recruits sex-positive writers to spread its interests, sex-positive Facebook users can 
also recruit Babeland into their identity construction or social action projects through their 
written interactions with the retailer.  
   After unpacking these processes of mutual sponsorship, I take up Goffman’s (1981) 
production format to examine how the functions of authorship, animation, and principalship lead 
to richer understandings of how sponsored writers function as social actors. Here I introduce 
examples in which animators have spread and repurposed other authors’ texts so quickly and 
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broadly that they have been framed by media and popular terminology through metaphors of 
virulence and memetics, in addition to a series of examples in which authors themselves invoke 
metaphors of virulence in portraying the messages they seek to spread. I find it productive to 
place these conceptual frameworks for understanding recomposition in conversation with 
frameworks of sponsorship, as viral, point-to-point models of circulation more ontologically 
focus on flat processes of spread rather than on the portrayal of the influence of a macro-social 
actor. Just as recognizing the multiply-distributed and sometimes overlapping functions of author, 
animator, and principal can help to enrich our understandings of the activity and agency of 
sponsored writers, so to can these functions help to reconcile metaphorical framings of 
composer-initiators in the metaphorical role of patient zero in outbreak narratives, a role that, on 
its own, does not capture the agency of either sponsors or sponsored writers in producing text, 
nor the often-collaborative interaction of multiple writers.  
   As I place the conceptual frameworks of sponsorship, viral and memetic spread, and 
Goffman’s production format in conversation with one another, I take up Spiro et al.’s (1989) 
argument that although analogies are an important tool in communicating, conceptualizing, and 
acquiring knowledge, their reduction of complex concepts to similar and more familiar 
analogical cores can impede fuller and richer understandings of the concepts they portray and 
often produce erroneous understanding. Their study posits two remedies to this problem: 1) to 
pay more conscious and sustained attention to the ways that analogies fail, mislead, or are 
incomplete and 2) to employ integrated multiple metaphors to better capture the complexity of 
difficult concepts or to employ several already known concepts rather than only one (p. 499). 
These remedies require detailed consideration of how each metaphor maps and doesn’t map onto 
the phenomenon of interest it is intended to explain. As I work to fuse and refine the metaphors 
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of sponsorship and viral spread, I argue that both of these metaphorical frameworks typically 
portray sponsored writers, text sharers, and readers as acted upon, afflicted, or otherwise 
interpellated, without focusing on their agency in composing, spreading, or ascribing value to the 
texts with which they interact. To address these problematic accounts of agency, I propose 
intervening in the analogies of sponsorship and viral contagion to more effectively capture the 
activities and agency of writers commonly identified as sponsored or even patient zeros. In 
addition to Goffman’s production format, I take up Lasswell’s (1981) metaphors of resonance 
and dampening and Kawachi’s (2008) study of spreaders and stiflers to explore how we might 
represent sponsored writers as not merely acted upon, but as social actors themselves. 
 Throughout this study, I employ the term recomposition (Ridolfo and DeVoss 2009) to 
cover the many activities of producing, promoting, sharing, and appropriating texts that are 
involved in the process of spreading them. In studying these various activities, it is important to 
investigate a variety of textual modes, particularly with the “viral” proliferation of multimodal 
texts across the Internet each day. Though terms such as “writing” and “literacy” tend to signal a 
limited range of the semiotic resources that are in fact involved in sponsorship and 
recomposition, especially in current digital domains, my sites of study frequently include image-
texts, or a combination of visual image and written text, as objects of study. Thus, I have also 
applied a multiliteracies approach to the study of literacy sponsorship, expanding the trope of 
sponsored literacy to include sponsored semiosis. In particular, Pahl and Rowsell (2006) 
emphasize the need to combine the New Literacy Studies (NLS) conceptualization of literacy as 
social practice (Street 1993) with multimodal approaches to literacy, which reveal how texts 
operate as material objects and how literacy sits within a much wider communicational 
landscape (p. 8). Likewise, Street, Pahl, and Rowsell (2009) call for scholars to bring 
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multimodality and NLS together to fill out a larger, more nuanced picture of social positionings 
and communication by building an equal recognition of practices, texts, contexts, space, and time 
(p. 194). Answering this call, my dissertation unpacks implications of literacy sponsorship that 
have yet to be fully explored: how sponsorship plays out in social domains, how it is 
technologically mediated, and how it is embodied by and through sponsors, sponsored writers, 
and their audiences.  
Chapter Outline 
  Chapter Two, “Synthesizing Sponsorships: Toward a Lens of Composite Sponsorship,” 
introduces as an object of inquiry systems of sponsorship in which two sponsors or more interact 
in bringing together writers with individual audiences within a networked compositional 
platform. In my primary example for analysis, I focus on sex-toy retailer Babeland’s sponsorship 
of writing contests within the compositional spaces of the “status update” and “comment” 
features of Facebook, a platform that, notably, requires legal names for its participating 
members. I observe that Babeland, through its writing prompts, and Facebook, through its terms 
of access to its compositional spaces, merge sex-positive ideologies and brand promotion with 
the social value of reputation—specifically constructed through legal names. I argue that 
Babeland thereby creates a multilayered composite between itself and Facebook and conclude by 
interrogating the consequences of this co-sponsorship. 
  Chapter Three, “The ‘Power Over What Goes Viral’: Locating Actors in the Circulation 
of ‘Viral’ Texts,” reviews viral and memetic understandings of recomposition and how they may 
act to obscure the work of both sponsors’ recruitment of writers and recruited writers’ production 
and dispersion of texts that are framed as viral and self-propagating. Examining the Twitter 
phenomenon of #AlexFromTwitter, the Philosoraptor T-shirt-design-gone-meme, and grassroots 
  9 
feminist movement grrrlVIRUS, this chapter considers the ways in which originators of viral 
texts have been recovered by reporters covering memetic phenomena; have fought to reclaim 
ownership of their texts after the texts’ popularity soared and was attributed to the masses; or 
conversely have invoked metaphors of virulence themselves, downplaying their involvement and 
disclaiming the identity of sole concept-originator in order to contribute to a larger collective. 
Taking up Goffman’s production format of authorship, animation, and principalship, I juxtapose 
examples in which authors actively sponsor the recomposition of their texts; demonstrate no such 
goals for recomposition; or find animators appropriating their texts against their specific goals 
for recomposition to question the degree to which intentionality fits in current conceptualizations 
of literacy sponsorship and to consider how more complex models of agency are needed than 
those offered by the conventional trope of top-down, unified sponsorship of passive writers.  
Chapter Four, “Containing Contagion: Medical Framings of Composition as Vector,” 
examines the sponsorship of the National Institute of Mental Health and the Center for Disease 
Control as they work to intervene in channels of mass communication of suicide reporting by 
recruiting writers with already assembled audiences to both spread and stifle (Kawachi 2008) 
specific messages under the advisement of the medical institutions. In this chapter, I argue that 
just as the supposed role of “speaker” actually covers a variety of roles of authorship, animation, 
and principalship, so too is the term “sponsor” in need of unpacking. In their recommendations 
for reporting suicide, both institutions’ writers animate the work of numerous authors’ scholarly 
works even as they ask others to further animate their guidelines for spreading their own 
messages and stifling competing messages. In these examples, principalship is complex. For 
example, NIMH and CDC sponsor messages that they judge to be in the public’s best interest. 
What do NIMH and CDC gain by persuading others to adopt their guidelines? What do news 
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media gain by following the guidelines? What do scholars and medical practitioners gain by 
getting their specific recommendations adopted and promulgated by these governmental 
agencies?  Without denying that there could be some economic influences (e.g., avoidance of 
liability for news media; internal bureaucratic advantage for scholars, doctors, and government 
officials), I argue that understanding sponsorship as motivated primarily by economics—even 
outside of literal financial gain—is quite limiting.  
In Chapter Five, “Conclusion: Integrating Multiple Metaphors of Literate Activity,” I 
shift my focus from the ways the metaphors and analogies discussed throughout this dissertation 
fail, mislead, or operate incompletely, and from modifying metaphors of sponsorship, such as 
with the lenses of confluent sponsorship, composite sponsorship, and dislocated sponsorship, to 
argue that our understandings of sponsorship and virality would further benefit from the 
integration of new analogies. I turn to Lasswell’s (1959) theory of resonance and Kawachi’s 
(2008) study of rumor spread to demonstrate the dynamic social activity of sponsored writers and 
consumer-recomposers through terms that do not define them primarily by their interpellation by 
their (apparent) sponsors. I examine how might we emphasize the agency of sponsored writers 
by focusing on their roles as animators, as resonators or spreaders, and as dampers or stiflers. 
This dissertation then concludes by considering how a multiple metaphors approach can help us 
to capture the agency of the frameworks listed above; the exchange of resources illuminated by 
metaphors of sponsorship; and the flat spread of texts that may change over time, as portrayed in 
metaphors of viral spread, for a more nuanced understanding of processes of recomposition.  
                                                
1 While the act of signing my name may appear weak as an example of composition, by signing my name to such a 
text, I become one of its animators. Though I am not necessarily the sounding box through which is its orated, as 
Goffman (1981) presents the idea, I am one of many participants metaphorically voicing another author’s text to an  
audience. 
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2 Lakoff and Johnson (1980) define a metaphorical entailment as the imparting of a characteristic of the source 
domain (the metaphorical image) to the target domain (the concept receiving metaphorical treatment) by logical 
means (p. 89).  
 
 
3  For further reading on the obfuscation of fact as socially constructed and possessing its own history of 
construction, see Latour and Woolgar’s (1986) Laboratory Life: The construction of Scientific Facts.  	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Chapter Two 
Synthesizing Sponsorships: Toward a Lens of Composite Sponsorship 
 
  In whatever form, sponsors deliver the ideological freight that must be borne for access to  
  what they have. Of course, the sponsored can be oblivious to or innovative with this  
  ideological burden. (Brandt, 1998, p. 168) 
 
 
 In 1993, Claire Cavanah and Rachel Venning opened the first Babeland sex-toy store 
(temporarily titled Toys in Babeland) in Seattle as a corrective to what was, in their view, a 
citywide shortage of women-friendly adult shops. Since its founding, Babeland has offered itself 
as a non-threatening, comfortable environment for customers to ask intimate questions about sex. 
This view is embodied in the company’s mission statement, which casts Babeland both as a 
provider of access to top-quality products and as a forum for women seeking to uninhibitedly 
explore their sexuality. It is this aspect of the mission, to educate, that is most highlighted on the 
company’s website, babeland.com, where a demarcation is set between the company’s brick-and-
mortar shops (which now total four), described as “stores,” and the website, described as 
“thriving and educational”; mention of the website’s commercial function is absent, rendering it 
an afterthought to the information available through the site (About Us: Babeland and Its 
Mission). Throughout babeland.com, in fact, founders and staff identify themselves as 
educational resources with features such as “Live Help,” “Ask Rachel and Claire,” “How-Tos,” 
“Sex Tips,” and “Staff Reviews” (listed separately from consumer reviews, which appear with 
the products). In addition to “Live Help,” “Ask Rachel and Claire,” and consumer reviews, 
hyperlinked “Community” spaces such as the Babeland Blog, Moms in Babeland (a second 
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blog), Facebook, and Twitter provide spaces in which consumers can interact with the 
information providers through questions or feedback.  
 These social media interactions between Babeland and consumers, and the role of 
sponsorship therein, are the subject of this chapter. Specifically, this chapter focuses on the 
sponsorship of writing in networked spaces, wherein Babeland and the networked compositional 
platform Facebook—which requires one’s legal name to gain membership—co-operate4 as 
sponsors.5 In current marketing trends in social network sites (SNS), I notice sponsors 
prompting, modeling, and rewarding compositions often rely on additional sponsorship to not 
only reach the sponsored writers but to further spread their economic and ideological interests 
beyond those individuals whose writing they directly elicit. For example, as retailers create 
Facebook pages and use the compositional spaces there to prompt consumer-written praise for 
their products and brands, they reach the consumers of writing they have prompted; each 
consumer-written response further reaches various members of an individual writer’s social 
network, allowing retailers direct network access to potential correspondents and indirect access 
to potential consumer markets. Building on Brandt’s (2001) demonstration that sponsors come in 
a variety of forms, including social institutions, public infrastructure, and communication 
technologies, this chapter examines systems of sponsorship in which one sponsor recruits 
composition through the technology of a writing platform that simultaneously enables recruiters 
to reach and make use of the writers they sponsor and constrains them in what they can compose, 
through both technological structure and rules for participation. Using Babeland’s sponsorship of 
writing contests within the “status update” and “comment”-feature compositional spaces of 
Facebook as a case study, I demonstrate that sponsorship is frequently multiple and layered, a 
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series of processes in which multiple sponsors elicit sponsored writers to structure channels 
between themselves and a broader audience than they could attract alone. 
 While Babeland.com has compositional spaces that allow writers to remain anonymous, 
pseudonymous, or ambiguous,6 contest guidelines for compositional sponsorship events such as 
the “Seven Days of Cobra Libre” giveaway require written participation on Facebook. Bound 
thus to verifiable composition, contest participants are identified as affiliates of Babeland’s brand 
within a vast social network where identity is constructed, and social capital gained, through 
public displays of connection.7 Regardless of whether participants see themselves as or explicitly 
declare themselves to be affiliates of Babeland or any other specific brand, their compositional 
act allows others within their network to interpret them as such. This may apply to networks such 
as Facebook, which do not legislate the interaction between business sponsors and sponsored 
writers. Nevertheless, the networks do enable this interaction by providing and profiting from the 
writing platforms for retailers to exploit, in turn rendering themselves co-operators in the 
sponsorship. The interactions between these multiple sponsors and sponsored writers yield 
mutually constitutive identity constructions that publicly represent each of the participants, 
human and corporate, to other social network users; much as sponsored writers are inevitably 
“branded” through their compositional interactions with Babeland, so is the retailer itself 
branded as potentially legitimate, mainstream, or, at the very least, not seedy.  
  The notion of multiple, simultaneously operating sponsorships has recently made inroads 
into literacy scholarship. While Brandt focuses on accumulations of sponsorship over the course 
of individuals’ lives, some scholars have begun to examine more temporally intersecting 
sponsorships. Webb-Sunderhaus (2007) has shown that sponsors of literacy can abet “competing 
meanings of literacy,” appearing as both enabler and inhibitor of literate activity through 
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seemingly contradictory messages about literacy (p. 7). Pavia (2013) argues that we need to 
consider the complementary and competing relationships among the multiple types of sponsors 
of digital literacies. In this chapter, I take up an example of what I term confluent sponsorship of 
literate activity. Facebook’s interest in providing a compositional platform that captures the 
attention of millions of consumers is confluent with the interests of retailers seeking to reach as 
many consumers as possible with information about their brand and products. Facebook, seeking 
user data to distribute to its advertising partners, thus sponsors both Babeland’s and Babeland’s 
potential consumers’ occasions for literacy use within the network. Babeland has an economic 
interest not only in the wellspring of user connections and compositional interactions within the 
network, but also in the platform’s requirement of identifiable authorship and its philosophy of 
identity as constructed through social connections. 
 This chapter introduces a lens of composite sponsorship, which examines sponsorship in 
terms of system by recognizing how interrelated sponsors interact with each other in specific 
settings, and asks how such a lens might raise new questions and awarenesses of who writes, 
where they write, for whom they write, and for what gains they write within networked writing 
economies. How can we more effectively understand such gains by studying the ideological 
freight borne through sponsorship in terms of both “freight” as a burden and “freight” as a 
service of conveying resources? How can such a perspective alter our understandings of how 
freight is not simply borne, but often leveraged? 
 As I proceed with my analysis, I begin with a background in Facebook’s founding 
principles in order to demonstrate how the philosophy informing the platform’s design operates 
so that users construct public identities not only through the content they post but also through 
their visible connections with others. Because the philosophy of social reputation as built upon 
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visible social connections lies at the core of the network’s design, it is essential to examine the 
intersection of the writing platform’s philosophies of participation in conjunction with the 
technological affordances and constraints that shape writers’ interactions with it.  
  From a brief background on Facebook’s sponsoring interest as a writing platform, I shift 
to an investigation of how Facebook structurally sponsors Babeland’s interactions with 
consumers, breaking down how Babeland uses Facebook’s interface to prompt, model, and 
reward composition through Facebook’s status and comment features, tweaking its prompts and 
the responses it receives throughout a contest awarding tickets to SHINE: A Burlesque Musical.  
After this exploration of composite sponsorship at a structural level, I move to an analysis 
of the “Seven Days of Cobra Libre” contest, in which Babeland prompted and rewarded “sex 
while driving” stories not in the anonymous, pseudonymous, or ambiguously identified 
compositional space of its home site but in the identifiable space of Facebook profiles. Through 
this case, I illustrate the synthesis of sponsored ideologies that can occur in composite 
sponsorship. Ultimately, I parse out Brandt’s metaphor of the ideological freight borne through 
sponsorship in order to examine sponsored writers as simultaneously acting and acted upon 
within a network of sponsors and sponsored writers, identities that I argue are not mutually 
exclusive.  
Facebook’s Role in Composite Sponsorship: Authenticity, Reputation, and Connections  
 
  This section works to provide an understanding of the mechanism of the writing platform 
that Facebook affords to users, whether individuals or corporations. Its implications for the 
building and projection of identity are essential to this project’s discussion. Because Babeland 
and its consumers are Facebook users, public displays of connection construct public identities 
for both. I specify “public identities” here to emphasize that regardless of whether the users 
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genuinely self-identify with them, these representations serve as identities for their digital social 
contacts to recognize and, as such, can have social repercussions for the individuals and the 
institutions they represent.8 As a sponsor, Facebook brings to its composite sponsorship with 
Babeland a specific construction of compositional space and an ideological emphasis on 
identifiable authorship and the construction of identity through social connections. 
  Numerous Facebook corporate documents stress the need for “real” names and identities 
and emphasize the security measures Facebook has in place to prevent the creation of inauthentic 
identities and the consequences of false identity construction. For example, Facebook’s Help 
Center explains Facebook security measures as enacted “to help ensure that Facebook remains a 
community of people using their real identities to connect and share” (Help Center). Facebook’s 
document of principles declares as the purpose of its authenticity standards “to make the world 
more open and transparent, which we believe will create greater understanding and connection. 
Facebook promotes openness and transparency by giving individuals greater power to share and 
connect” (Facebook Principles). Within its list of ten founding principles,9 Facebook defines 
“social value” (the fifth principle) as “the freedom to build trust and reputation through their 
identity and connections” (Facebook Principles). Within this structural perception of a social 
reputation as built upon visible connections, Facebook emphasizes “[m]aking connections [as] 
the main way to express yourself on your profile” (Help Center: Community Pages and profile 
connections). Thus, wall10 posts to one’s connections, both on one’s own wall and on others’ 
walls as they appear in user newsfeeds, are the main way that Facebook users construct their 
identities through literate practice. As boyd (2011) observes, Facebook profiles themselves are 
the locus of a Facebook user’s social-networked written interaction as conversations take place 
directly on user profiles (p. 43). As such, the writing that appears on Facebook profiles reflects 
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not only a user’s engagement with the social network site based on the conversations appearing 
on his or her profile but also the writer’s engagement with the individuals, organization, brands, 
and ideologies with whom he or she makes public connections. Because the writing that appears 
on a user’s Facebook wall works to shape that user’s identity, boyd argues, participants do not 
have complete control over their self-representation.  
  Facebook’s affordance of compositional space provides retailers with a platform in which 
consumers are already consuming and producing texts. My analysis departs from the necessary 
observation that retailers that do not necessarily pay for ad space, can reap the benefits of a social 
network’s drawing consumers together. Inviting consumers to become part of the advertising 
process on Facebook requires no financial payment to the social network site. 
 As a business that takes advantage of Facebook’s compositional space to connect with 
current and attract new customers, Babeland co-operates with Facebook’s network not only to 
prompt compositions but further to channel them beyond the writers they sponsor for the 
consumption of each writer’s social contacts. The utility of user platform migration for Babeland 
is manifest most obviously in the company’s “Toy-a-Day Giveaway” writing contest 
participation. For this contest, Babeland asked consumers to identify themselves as a “friend” or 
“fan” of this company with the possibility of a reward in turn for such public identification. “All 
you need to do is become a Friend or Fan of Babeland on any of our official Facebook pages and 
send us a quick ‘Hello’ on our wall or via Facebook mail11 to let us know you want to win one of 
these great toys” (Babeland’s Toy-a-Day Giveaway). The webpage provides links to three 
official Babeland pages—Babeland NYC, Babeland Seattle12 and the Babeland.com Fan Page—
allowing consumers to move, with one click, from a digital space wherein they can participate 
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anonymously, pseudonymously, or ambiguously to a site where the actual names of users are 
both expected and (to varying degrees) enforced.  
  Such a move calls attention to the ideological freight borne in accessing Facebook’s 
provision of compositional space. In receiving access to Facebook’s mass-distributed 
compositional spaces, a retailer gains exposure to potential customers. Sponsorship of 
composition thus not only shapes the sponsored writers’ production of writing but also acts as a 
mode of reaching other consumers in their social network. In turning to Facebook as a 
sponsoring platform for its writing contests, Babeland rewards not simply compositions that help 
to demonstrate the appeal of their products, such as helping to construct a supposedly inherent 
sex appeal of cars for their car-inspired toy, but also users’ functional self-identification as a 
brand affiliate through their correspondence. Babeland’s access to and use of Facebook’s 
compositional network necessitates further analysis of Brandt’s concept of sponsored writers as 
bearing the ideological freight of its sponsor; Babeland does not bear such freight as a burden, as 
this branding in fact should benefit the company, but rather potentially bears this ideological 
weight reproductively, multiplying opportunities for its own compositional (and thus ideological) 
sponsorship. The following sections of this chapter review Facebook’s structuring of “authentic” 
identities constructed around public displays of connection to inform how the selection of a 
writing platform as an initial layer of sponsorship can additionally layer ideology to a second 
sponsor’s benefit. 
Composite Sponsorship at a Structural Level: The Role of the Writing Platform Interface 
in Sponsorship 
 
 Facebook’s interface, its structuring of compositional spaces, its determination of how 
many characters users can include, of how they can be “tagged” or hyperlinked to one another, 
and its affordances to upload photos and video all work to structure what, how, and in what 
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contexts its users can compose. The construction of compositional space (whether through digital 
coding or otherwise) is thus one process of sponsorship: beyond providing a context for 
composition, compositional interfaces facilitate, constrain, and ultimately regulate how and what 
a person can compose within its affordances and boundaries. And it is through this compositional 
structure that Babeland rewards consumer writing with material prizes such as featured products 
or tickets to sex-positive events. Babeland and a number of other retailers (including sex-toy 
company LELO, t-shirt retailer Threadless, and DSW, formerly Discount Shoe Warehouse) take 
up this structure to carry out writing contests that prompt sponsored compositions to appear in 
various social networks’ newsfeeds across Facebook. How Babeland specifically decides to use 
the structures that Facebook provides to influence their contest writers and those writers’ readers, 
then, is one facet of the composite sponsorship of Babeland and Facebook; the platform’s 
interface shapes Babeland’s interactions with writers.  
 Between Tuesday, June 29 and Thursday, July 1, 2010, Babelandsea Seattle issued a 
series of status updates prompting Facebook “friends” to comment on its Facebook wall to win 
tickets to SHINE: A Burlesque Musical. Through this contest, Babeland deployed its sponsorship 
of literate activity through repeated and revised writing prompts that increasingly narrowed 
compositional content to specifically focus consumer responses to capture elements of the 
product being raffled. In the first message, Babelandsea Seattle posted, “We are giving away 2 
tickets to SHINE: A Burlesque Musical [hypertext]. Just comment below to enter to win. 
Winners chosen on Thursday” (Babelandsea Seattle).  
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Figure 2.1 
At this point in the giveaway, contest guidelines said simply to leave a comment without 
specifying content. Similarly, the third post appears simply to remind readers to post a comment 
of any kind: “Last day to enter to win tickets to SHINE: A Burlesque Musical. We are giving 
away 2 pairs today. Leave a comment below to enter” (Babelandsea Seattle). Comments to these 
posts typically express a general interest in winning the tickets – “Pick me, pick me!”, 
“meeeeeeeee” – or in the show and the contest itself – “AWESOME!”, “yay!”, “That's very 
cool!” (Babelandsea Seattle). These messages appear to fulfill the contest criterion of leaving a 
comment and have the concomitant effect of hyping the show itself. 
  On the second day of the three-day contest, Babelandsea Seattle posted a second prompt 
for the giveaway, spurring new comment-entries: “Have you entered to win tickets to SHINE: A 
Burlesque Musical [hypertext] yet? we [sic] have 2 pairs of tickets and we are picking a winner 
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tomorrow! Leave a little sparkly love below to enter to win” (Babelandsea Seattle). Of the first 
few comments, half appear to appeal to the “sparkly” and half to the “love” of the “sparkly love” 
guidelines: “Loveloveloveee. ♥”; “Sparkle!”; “i would love to go!”; “glitta glitta haaay!” 
(Babelandsea Seattle). After these four comments, Babelandsea Seattle jumped in with praise, 
encouragement, and further comment guidelines to more explicitly capture the burlesque show 
for which tickets are being raffled: “Great Glitter and Sparkle comments y'all. Keep 'em coming. 
Think pasties and tassels and shimmy and shaking. It IS a BURLESQUE musical after all” 
(Babelandsea Seattle). Here, Babeland appears to have found the initial comments’ generality 
lacking. Therefore, beyond flattering those comments and explicitly appealing for more, 
Babeland stimulates and molds the comments to come by elaborating the call to leave “sparkly 
love” with a conjuration of the “pasties and tassels and shimmy and shaking” of the burlesque 
show advertised.  
  Following the re-crafting of this prompt, Babeland received fifteen additional messages, 
reproduced below:  
  blinggggggg! 
  Little sparkly love 
  sparkle!! 
  ~*~*~*~*~*~*~*~*~*~*~*~*~*~*~*~*~*~*~*~*~*~*~**~* 
  ♥ 
  Please yes....yes please - love sparkle! 
  ***♥*** :D 
  Mwah.Mwah.Mwah.Mwah!**xoxo** 
  ***little sparkly love!*** ♥ 
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   Sparkling Pasties and Twirling Tassels - so much fun to see them in action 
  Sparkly rays coming out from the giant vagina on the Babeland float! XD LMAO! 
  oh ho! would love to be there!!! 
  I need the "SHINE" in my life please....... 
  Thinking all pasties and tassels and shimmy and shaking. It IS a BURLESQUE musical  
    after all. :) 
   *******♥******* 
These comments exemplify writers responding to specific Babeland posts that direct the content 
of their writing within a reward system. In addressing the prompt, several posters even assume 
its language nearly word for word, as in “Little sparkly love”; “***little sparkly love!*** ♥”; and 
“Thinking all pasties and tassels and shimmy and shaking. It IS a BURLESQUE musical after 
all. :).” Multiple posters chose to emulate “sparkly love” with images rather than written words, 
such as “~*~*~*~*~*~*~*~*~*~*~*~*~*~*~*~*~*~*~*~*~*~*~**~*”, “***♥*** :D”, and 
“*******♥*******,” or with both images and text, as in the case of “***little sparkly love!*** 
♥.” Though the commenters have gone about answering the prompt in different ways, every 
response13 takes up the terms “sparkly love” with the word “love,” variations of the word 
“sparkly” (“sparkling,” “sparkle”), textual images of sparkles (**), textual images of love (♥) or 
words that evoke sparkling (“blinggggggg!”). 
  In this case, Babeland is asking respondents to craft their responses to meet the particular 
compositional goal of more specifically representing the tickets being raffled. This treatment of 
Facebook users as, in a sense, students who must suit their responses to company guidelines for 
their reward appears in one commenter’s response to Babeland’s announcement of contest 
winners; this commenter asked Babeland what she had to say to win the contest and what the 
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winners said: “Babeland, I missed it...what did I have to say to win a ticket? or what did the 
winners say?” (Babelandsea Seattle). In this post, this Babelandsea Seattle “friend” identifies a 
relationship between the content of participatory comments and the prizes Babeland distributes 
to select participants. Her question “what did I have to say to win a ticket?” suggests an 
understood requirement of answering a specific prompt (“what did I have to say”) for a reward 
(the ticket). Her second question, “what did the winners say?,” further identifies a hierarchy of 
responses; the post assumes that the ticket winners have won their reward through the response 
closest to what Babeland wants (as opposed to being randomly selected).14 Such concern for the 
winning way of writing speaks to the perception or assumption of an evaluation on Babeland’s 
part in determining the most appropriate, and thus most successful, composition for winning the 
contest. 
 In this example, Facebook structurally sponsors social relations between Babeland, as the 
initial speaker, and the brand’s potential consumers, as respondents. I observe similarities 
between Babeland’s reissuing of the contest writing prompt and a classroom instructor’s re-
articulation of writing prompts when initial student responses—made orally or through writing in 
class or homework—do not align with the instructor’s intentions or desired outcomes. In this 
respect, I see Facebook’s organization of conversation threads as lending itself to an Initiation-
Reply-Evaluation (IRE) mode of recruiting writing. The documentation of this IRE15 pattern of 
instructor and instructed interactions was originally developed through studies of common 
structures of classroom discourse in which an instructor initiates writing with a prompt or 
assignment, the student replies with a text,16 and the instructor evaluates the product (Mehan, 
1979; Prior, 1998; Sinclair and Coulthard, 1975; Wallace and Ewald, 2000).  
  Facebook’s structure of indenting responses beneath the initial prompt, but not allowing 
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responses to be indented beneath other participants’ responses, structures all comments as 
responding to the initial Babeland prompt, never identifying a new Initiator to whom to respond 
within the many comments (as many threaded forums do). Individuals first seeing the contest or 
returning to it later can easily locate prompt responses through this organization, and Facebook 
notification settings allow users who have participated to receive messages whenever a new 
comment appears, keeping the conversation alive across time and space, as users need not remain 
present in real time.  
Confluent Ideologies: The Use of Identifiability in a Networked Economy 
 In addition to the promotion of sex-positivity on its home site, Babeland prompts and 
rewards those bold enough to connect their names to publicly distributed narratives of public 
sexual acts. With the “Seven Days of Cobra Libre” contest, Babeland, according to the 
guidelines on its website, gave away seven Fun Factory Cobra Libre vibrating masturbation 
sleeves to users who responded via comments to any of the “sex questions” Babeland asked on 
its official Facebook pages over the course of seven days. Participation came with a caveat: “You 
will need to be a member of Facebook to participate in this contest” (“Seven Days of Cobra 
Libre”), warns the guidelines, thus syncing Babeland with Facebook’s requirements of 
identifiable authorship. Some of the contest questions included:  
• The Cobra Libre design was inspired by the AC Shelby Cobra; 
what other cars scream "sleek and sexy"? 
• Planes, trains, and automobiles – are you turned on by sex en route? 
• On the hood, in the back seat, solo? What car sex positions are out there?  
(“Seven Days of Cobra Libre”) 
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Other questions asked contestants, “Does driving fast get you aroused?,” “Do you have a ‘sex 
while driving’ story?,” and “What car seems like it was designed with car sex in mind?” 
(Babeland Seattle). These questions are followed up with the instruction “Comment below to 
enter to win the Cobra Libre today” or “Win the Fun FactoryCobra [sic] Libre by answering this 
question” (Babeland Seattle). When consumers responded to these questions, their names 
appeared next to the comment as a hyperlink allowing readers to connect to their profile, which 
may or may not have been public or private to varyingly fractal degrees.17 Facebook profile 
photos appeared next to names and comments as well, although these photos do not always show 
the user. Entries were often sexually explicit. 
  In response to “Do you have a ‘sex while driving’ story?” one contest entrant writes,  
  “Why yes, I do. On our honeymoon, my partner and I drove from Montana to the Oregon  
  coast. To pass the time during the drive, we told each other stories, talked dirty, and  
  generally did our best to get each other hot and bothered. It worked like a charm! And  
  even when things got a little touchy-feely, we managed not to crash” (Babeland Seattle). 
Another uses her partner’s name in her response:  
  “Paul and I used to live in CA, taking long drives regularly to visit family...we often  
  talked dirty, or talked about fantasies we each had. A few times on hwy 101, when the  
  talking had become uncomfortable squirming, I leaned over and gave Paul one of his  
  number one fantasies. Hwy Oral, and let me just say as good as I am, Paul is a very  
  steady driver :P” (Babeland Seattle).  
Such Facebook comments, as boyd (2011) observes, “are not simply a dialogue between two 
interlocutors, but a performance of social connection before a broader audience” (p. 45). 
Consumer responses will be seen not only by Babeland, or even only by other Babeland 
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consumers, but likely by numerous Facebook friends subscribed to a user’s newsfeed updates as 
well.  
 In responding to such prompts, these users have constructed their compositional sexual 
identities—as well of the identities of the sexual partners they include in such narratives—on 
Facebook as per Babeland’s instruction, publishing the specific stories that Babeland prompts—
in this case, sexual narratives surrounding the semi-public space of a car. Babeland instigates 
expressions of both public or semi-public sexual desires—by asking, for example, for 
information about contest participants’ “turn-ons” en route on planes, trains, automobiles—and 
practices—by soliciting entries about, for example, “sex while driving stories,” positions on the 
hood, in the back seat, etc. These contest prompts, coupled with the contest requirement of 
publishing the explicit narratives under one’s legal18 name on the Babeland Facebook wall, 
transgress social norms of public decency—what constitutes social propriety versus tackiness, 
vulgarity, or even immorality. Such challenges to constructions of public, private, and normative 
sexual behavior are, of course, of interest to a company, of whose products are prohibited under 
obscenity laws in various states; widespread word-of-mouth can help to promote products whose 
public advertisement on television broadcasts or billboards would be greatly limited by social 
and legal constraints. 
  On Facebook, the elicitation of consumer compositions about products and brands 
distributes consumer word-of-mouth both deeply and broadly. That is to say, a consumer’s 
Facebook friends can view his or her compositions or writing and hear about a brand or product 
from a familiar source, while a consumer visiting a retailer’s Facebook page can read about that 
company’s brand and product from a number of sources beyond his or her individual network of 
friends. Marketing research suggests that both consumers and retailers value consumer-produced 
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information regarding product use and attempt to counteract consumer concerns about 
information asymmetry between themselves and vendors (Bebczuk 2003; Mackiewicz 2010; 
Paradis 1994; Park, Lee, and Han 2007). In other words, retailers acknowledge consumer 
skepticism about whether a product is as it was advertised—skepticism that proceeds from the 
consumer’s lack of commercial interest in or firsthand knowledge of the product—and 
simultaneously recognize that they themselves may not be the most disinterested mouthpiece for 
removing that skepticism. To give a more authentic attestation to a product’s pros and potential, 
therefore, retailers seek consumer reviews for distributing knowledge. Just as consumers are 
likelier to favor an alternative perspective, the thinking goes, so will they value what they likely 
see as a more objective source to back up the retailer’s claims. 
  As such, Babeland can make productive use of the ideological freight it amasses from 
Facebook’s sponsorship of identifiable authorship in social networks. In a compositional space in 
which both sponsor and sponsored publish, the publications construct compositional flecks of 
identity for both the page owner and its visitors. As Babeland scripts the sexual narratives and 
ideologies it sees as productive to both company sales and consumer sexual health, sponsored 
responses to these scripts ultimately co-construct facets of identity of both the sponsor and the 
sponsored to other social network participants. How, then, can we understand this co-
construction of participants’ identities to both take into account Babeland’s influence and the 
writers’ agency in actively choosing to participate in such visible interaction? How do we 
understand sponsored writers as admittedly used by their sponsors, but as not simply bearing the 
ideological freight they bear as a burden but potentially leveraging it for their own means?  
  Just as Babeland can make use of Facebook’s creation of a social network in which users’ 
personal lives are particularly identifiable to one another19 in order to have users “walk the walk” 
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of sex-positivity by composing about sex without anonymity, Babeland’s consumer-participants 
can self-present as sex-positive, feminist, transgressive, sexual and/or sexy by not only taking up 
Babeland’s invitations to interact but specifically in taking advantage of a context in which to 
bring up such discussions. Babeland’s freight may certainly act as a weight these writers bear in 
terms social connections who find these compositions tacky, vulgar, or immoral, but that does 
not mean that they do not necessarily bear the weight willingly, or even purposefully. If we 
consider, for a moment, the incentives for lifting physical weights, we might conjure several 
potentially overlapping purposes: shaping the form one presents to the world, the representation 
others see; developing greater strength; displaying feats of strength to those viewing; efforts at 
general self-improvement and becoming more well-rounded; feeling empowered after the effort 
put forth; and genuinely enjoying the activity of consensual, even recreational, labor. In each of 
these contexts, weight-lifters put weights to use, often for themselves. In the case of Facebook, 
Babeland, and the Facebook users in Babeland’s social network, however, the writers that 
Facebook and Babeland co-sponsor can leverage this ideological freight not only to articulate 
themselves through their shared interests with Babeland but further to work to create sex-positive 
culture for themselves and others.  
  For example, in summer 2010, Babeland ran its “Come for a Cause” campaign to raise 
money and awareness for causes of sex education, specifically in support of the Sexuality 
Information and Education Council of the United States (SIECUS). Toward this cause, the 
company explicitly merged the promotion of sex-positivity20 with the products it trades in: 
   “As many of our customers will tell you, a great sex toy experience can be truly life- 
  changing. Learning how to orgasm for the first time, coming from a new position, or  
  discovering a new erogenous zone are all possible with the right toy. That's why helping  
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  you find the right toy to suit your needs is our #1 concern at all times. Even if you aren't  
  sure what you're looking for, our helpful staff knows just how to guide you on the path to  
  orgasmic bliss!” (Babeland).  
Babeland worked to incite dialogue among Facebook users about their experiences with 
publicizing sexual intent through the purchase or acquisition of condoms, oral contraceptives, 
and sex toys, asking: “Do you remember trying to buy condoms, birth control, or sex toys the 
first time, and what it felt like?” Users answered with personal accounts describing varying 
levels of comfort in their experiences:  
 
  “I was buying condoms and lube w my BF at the time, and the checker person  
  was someone I went to HS with. He gave me a funny look, and then tried to start a  
  conversation but I was so embarrassed, I turned red, and couldn't acknowledge  
  him at... all.” 
 
  “Never bought condoms, always gotten them from Planned Parenthood. Never  
  really thought about whether or not getting my hormonal birth control should be  
  weird, but buying sex toys is still enought [sic] to make me blush sometimes. Not  
  entirely sure why...” 
 
  “My first sex toy was a vibrator from the Pink Pussycat Boutique in the Village.  
  Wasn't embarrassed at all, unless you count me wondering out loud exactly who  
  some of those toys would fit inside...something I still wonder to this day!” 
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In talking openly about the potential discomfort of publicly acquiring sex products, these 
consumers make discussions of sexual activity more public. The writers’ agency appears not 
only in their choice as to whether to respond to Babeland’s prompts and their rhetorical decisions 
in how to respond but also in leveraging the freight of Babeland’s sponsorship of sex-positivity 
and Facebook’s sponsorship of identifiable authorship in social connection. In so publicly 
signing off on their own sexual activity to their social contacts, the writers implicitly work to 
foster a culture in which such conversations are more socially acceptable and less uncomfortable 
in the future. 
The Freight of Sponsorship as Rhetorical Resource 
  In this chapter, I have examined how Babeland and its sponsored writers act to align and 
forge networks among existing resources, and I have unpacked the implications of the composite 
sponsorship that is the effect of that linking. Specifically, I have found that the composite 
sponsorship between Babeland and Facebook merges the sex-positive ideologies and brand 
promotion that Babeland sponsors through its writing prompts and, with publicly displayed and 
certifiable network connections, the social value of reputation that Facebook sponsors through its 
terms of access to its compositional spaces. For the writer, the synthesis of these sponsorships 
means the prompting, rewarding, and regulating of a named and identifiable affiliation with the 
Babeland brand, the sexual products it vends, and the sexual desires and practices such products 
mark. By posting on Babeland’s Facebook pages, writers not only endorse Babeland’s brand to 
their social contacts on Facebook and weave Babeland’s brand into their own identities; they also 
further the sex-positive philosophy that Babeland wants to promote, whether out of the 
ideological stances of its founders or out of the economic optimization of its mission as a 
business. And by actively engineering the compositions in this space—first by enticing writers 
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with the promise of prize rewards and then by assessing their entries’ fit with the writing prompt 
as they are submitted—Babeland directly aids those users who, through their speech on the 
store’s behalf, seek to incorporate and highlight their connection to Babeland into the networked 
identity they are actively shaping for themselves. 
  The convergence of multiple sponsors—Facebook, the social network platform, and 
Babeland, the retailer—in producing this end results in structural significance and ideological 
freight distinct from those resulting from the operation of either sponsor on its own. I propose 
taking this analysis of freight still one step further, examining freight not simply as a load or 
burden to bear (or even flex) but also as a service of conveying resources. Consider the examples 
from the introduction of this dissertation: social and political organizations providing audiences 
both aligned (in shared interests) and assembled (already organized as recipients on mailing lists) 
with scripts for lobbying their government representatives; critiquing companies for their acts 
and policies; or spreading information about and arguments for causes throughout their social 
networks. While these scripts may be in many ways constrained, they can also provide 
consumer-sharers with news, with complex concepts to consider, and with language to use in 
contacting others to spread messages that express their shared interests. Not only is it faster and 
easier for potential advocates to get involved in causes they support, but with access to data, 
language, and arguments they might not otherwise be able to muster on the spot—particularly in 
discussions on social network sites—advocates may more effectively perform their parts with the 
technological affordances that allow for easily be copying, pasting, and hyperlinking text to 
share. 
  We can similarly apply this framework of freight as conveying resources to the example 
of co-sponsorship between Facebook and Babeland. Through the Cobra Libre contest prompts 
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and Come for a Cause campaign, Babeland offers not only talking points in their prompts but 
contexts for discussing otherwise socially inappropriate matters of conversation. Their invitation 
to discussion allows for sharing stories that would appear especially abrupt without such an 
occasion for raising the subject in public. Asking for such stories specifically for purposes of 
social change, or even prizes, gives users cause to share such narratives publicly. In addition to 
the resources Babeland provides in post content and rhetorical opportunity, Facebook’s digital 
network of intersecting social circles enables Babeland’s affiliates to engage the interests that 
they and Babeland share with people outside of their current social contacts, other Babeland 
affiliates, and people in their current social contacts not already availing themselves of 
Babeland’s resources.  
  By ventriloquizing through their social contacts, by promoting direct repetitions in 
contests such as SHINE, and by scripting sexual narratives in contests such as the Seven Days of 
Cobra Libre, Babeland dislocates its sponsorship to a degree, working to elicit not only consumer 
enthusiasm for their brand and products but enthusiastic responses that appear to be the 
consumers’ own words that she or he wishes to share with others. However, Babeland cannot 
afford to disappear entirely from the discussions it prompts; keeping its brand name known and 
positively viewed is important both for profit and for staying afloat to promote its social cause. 
In the next chapter, I will examine a series of sponsors whose identities do not remain as visible 
across the recomposition of their texts as I study the conceptual framework of sponsorship in 
conjunction with metaphorical frameworks of recomposition taken up both within and outside of 
academia in portrayals of viral or memetic spread. 
                                                
4 I use the term “co-operate” rather than “cooperate” to emphasize these sponsors as operating upon sponsored 
writers simultaneously.  
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5 While Facebook users have successfully set up “fake” Facebook pages for identities under made-up names, names 
attributed to fictional characters, and so on by connecting multiple accounts to separate email addresses, Facebook’s 
Statement of Rights and Responsibilities asserts the right to shut down profiles of users that do so (Statement of 
Rights and Responsibilities). This policing of authentic named identities creates a productive avenue for marketing 
through word of mouth, allowing for a wider distribution than non-digital face-to-face interactions but a greater 
degree of personal accountability to known friends than anonymous, pseudonymous, or ambiguous consumer 
reviews. Furthermore, users who set up accounts for themselves under a false name, rather than accounts for entirely 
fictional personae, are still representing themselves to their social contacts. Such accounts might be more difficult 
for future employers to locate, but current social contacts would still be privy to the social actions and connections 
publicized by those accounts.  
 
6 For example, consumers might post their names and locations, such as “Danielle from USA,” without much risk of 
identification.  
 
7 Judith Donath and danah boyd (2004) define a public display of connections as an implicit verification of identity 
that ventures one’s reputation with all transactions; a negative transaction with one member of a network can sully 
one’s reputation with other members of that network (p. 73).  
 
8 One example of such repercussions is that of Stacy Snyder, whom Millersville University accused of promoting 
underage drinking through a photo she posted in 2005 with the caption “Drunken Pirate,” for which the institution 
denied her a certification in teaching in 2006. Even in 2015, a Google search for “Stacy Snyder” brings up not only 
Snyder’s story but also the actual photo of her in costume, drinking from a plastic cup. After ten years, it is possible 
and actually very easy to locate and view a text that Snyder undoubtedly composed and shared with little insight into 
the degree to which it would impact her reputation, let alone her life trajectory. Snyder’s story helps to illuminate the 
stakes of digitally mediating transgressive behavior in identifiable contexts. 
 
9 Freedom to Share and Connect, Ownership and Control of Information, Free Flow of Information, Fundamental 
Equality, Social Value, Open Platforms and Standards, Fundamental Service, Common Welfare, Transparent 
Process, and One World 
 
10 The Facebook “wall” has since disappeared with the “timeline” feature now serving the same function for posting. 
 
11 This option to participate through less publicly visible composition disappeared in later contests, which required 
public wall or timeline posts. 
 
12 This link actually leads to what is currently listed as Babelandsea Seattle, a personal profile, and not to the 
Babeland Seattle fan page. 
 
13 Given that this, after all, a burlesque musical, this excepts the response that nearly word for word repeats 
Babeland’s prompt to think all pasties and tassels and shimmy and shaking. 
 
14 Babeland, in fact, never specifies that the best answer will win the tickets and may, like a radio station, simply 
choose the fifth response. 
 
15 or IRF in earlier definitions using the term “feedback” 
 
16 This can include oral participation. 
 
17 Here, I invoke Patricia Lange’s (2008) representation of hybrid forms of fractalized gradations between “public” 
and “private” in “publicly private” and “privately public” activity on online social networks. These notions of 
fractalized gradations of privacy are drawn from Susan Gal’s (2002) theorization of the public/private dichotomy as 
having a fractal distinction in that “the distinction between public and private can be reproduced repeatedly by 
projecting it onto narrower contexts or broader ones” (p. 81). Gal provides the example of the home as contrasting 
with the public nature of the street, while in narrowing one’s focus inside of the house, the living room becomes the 
public part of a domestic private space, such that “the public/private distinction is reapplied and now divides into 
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public and private what was, from another perspective, entirely ‘private’ space” (p. 82). 
 
18 While numerous Facebook users succeed in creating Facebook profiles under pseudonyms, they are still 
recognized within their social networks. I, for example, have numerous contacts using the network pseudonymously, 
largely protect themselves professionally, and yet their I still understand their interactions on the network as theirs. 
  
19 more so than in discussion forums with fewer technological affordances or socially appropriate contexts for 
sharing photos of personal moments as varied as restaurant experiences, professional engagement photos, and at-
home pet and baby photos 
 
20 For the purposes of this project, I draw on Cliff Pervocracy of the self-identified kinky, feminist sex blog 
Pervocracy and Sesali B. from the online community Feministing in defining sex-positivity as understanding sexual 
pleasure as a legitimate thing worthy of ethical exploration; as interrogating pre-conceived notions about what kind 
of sex people should have and judgments about what kind of ethical sex people do have, while demanding sexual 
activity be consensual; and as supporting honest, non-judgmental, and comprehensive sex education. 
 
  36 
Chapter Three 
The “Power Over What Goes Viral”: Locating Actors in the Circulation of “Viral” Texts 
 
  On October 26, 2014, a Texas teenager snapped a cell phone picture that would start a 
Twitter trend, stir controversy about a potential marketing hoax, and turn an unknown 16-year-
old Target employee into an internet celebrity later featured on CNN and The Ellen Show. 
Fifteen-year-old Brooklyn Reiff told The Daily Dot that her friend Alanna Page had tweeted 
about an attractive teen working at a Target checkout register, and when Reiff later found herself 
in his checkout line, she snapped his picture and retweeted it to friend (Votta 2014a). On 
November 2, Twitter user @auscalum tweeted Reiff’s photo to her 14,000 followers, bringing so 
much attention to the image that, for days, its origin was debated, incorrectly attributed to 
@auscalum, and even claimed by Los Angeles startup Breakr. The boy in her photo, Alex 
LaBeouf, became immortalized with the hashtag #AlexFromTarget. 
  On November 3, Dil-Dominé Jacobe Leonares claimed in a LinkedIn post to have 
orchestrated Alex’s rise to fame as a way to demonstrate that he and his colleagues could build a 
fan base for anyone that could theoretically translate from a large following into a career 
(Figures 3.1 and 3.2):  
 
Figure 3.1 
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  Figure 3.2 
 
Here, Leonares identifies the first person with a large audience to spread the content—“(Abbie 
@auscalum) one of our fangirls from Kensington, UK”—but not the actual originator of the 
image, an oversight numerous media outlets noticed, particularly when @auscalum denied any 
connection to, or even familiarity with, Breakr (Broderick 2014; McKinney 2014; Votta 2014a, 
2014b). As journalists, bloggers, and followers of the story tried to make sense of the conflicting 
accounts, their portrayal of the image’s rapid circulation took on the language of an outbreak 
narrative (see Figure 3.3). On the same day that Leonares posted his claim, Dayna Evans (2014) 
of Gawker wrote, “We still don't know who the first person to tweet the photo—patient zero—
was,” casting her refutation as an epidemiological quest to find the index case of infection. As 
reporters began to tease out inconsistencies in Leonares’s claim that undermined its veracity, Jess 
Zimmerman (2014) asserted in The Guardian that “nobody wants to be handed an advertisement, 
then told it’s part of a grassroots phenomenon. That’s not ‘viral’; it’s just condescending.” Per 
Zimmerman’s distinction, viral spread is natural and spontaneous, organic and not pre-
orchestrated. 
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Figure 3.3 
 
 How did #AlexFromTarget come to be understood in terms of outbreak and virulence? 
Mark Giesler (2014) represents both the appeal and limitations of epidemiological framings of 
recomposition in his depiction of them as fantasy: “The case of #alexfromtarget feeds into our 
longstanding epidemiological fantasies: the idea of creating an innovation, a new technology, an 
advertising campaign, a meme, or a piece of online content so brilliantly designed, captivating, 
funny or otherwise compelling, it will virtually spread overnight.” #AlexFromTarget, like other 
memes, has not spread with the agency of a virus; people actively distributed it and then came to 
see it as the agent spreading itself.  Indeed, the very idea that there was a contagious meme only 
emerged during the process of hundreds of thousands of people sharing, manipulating, and 
adding entirely new meanings to the original photo through Twitter, Facebook, Instagram and 
other platforms.” In describing the appeal of creating something with an innate, inevitable 
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transference beyond the immediate audience, an inherent spreadable quality, Giesler provides a 
rationale for mapping physiological processes, such as viral infection, to the socialization of 
thoughts and social structures through composition. Invoking virulence both implies the 
successful delivery of a message and likewise assumes that ideas themselves can somehow effect 
their own spread. But the attractiveness of this notion does not hold up under scrutiny: as Giesler 
observes, “virulence” ignores the agency of consumer-producers, those truly responsible for 
furthering spread. 
 Despite the agency trick here diagnosed, the idea of “virality” persists within popular 
media and scholarship. Indeed, while lay and academic use of terms such as meme and going 
viral might not appear to have a substantial effect on the production, dispersion, or consumption 
of texts, Mitchell (2011) argues that such popular use of the contagion metaphor in and across 
public and cultural discourse attests to the concept’s potency and currency” (p. 4). Furthermore, 
the uptake of these terms in academic scholarship has skewed recent publications to present the 
dispersion of so-called memes as not only metaphorically contagious (Burgess 2008; Guadagno 
et al. 2013; Kumar 2015; Nelson-Field, Riebe, and Newstead 2013; Wiggins and Bowers 2014) 
but further as mathematically mappable through epidemiological understandings of the spread of 
infection (Wang and Wood 2011). 
 In Chapter Two, I worked to add dimension to the vertically oriented metaphor of 
sponsorship by examining the intersecting action of multiple sponsors in recruiting writers to 
advance a brand and the consumer-writers’ subsequent use of the compositional space granted 
them by this sponsorship to brand themselves (or to become branded). Even as actions 
overlapped and interests converged, however, my chosen representative example, Babeland, 
exhibited an articulated and easily traced lineage of sponsor, prompt, composition, and 
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distribution. Chapter Three interrogates cases in which compositions spread so quickly and 
broadly that their original impetus and authorship are difficult to track down and identify—cases, 
in other words, erroneously called “viral.” 
 In particular, Chapter Three confronts examples of rapid mass circulation in which 
individuals appropriate and spread texts in the absence of, explicitly against, or in concert with 
the original authors’ goals for recomposition. I ask the following questions: What rhetorical 
activities are potentially obscured or facilitated through frameworks of writing as infectious? 
What is the role of content producers within the framework of an outbreak narrative? What 
rhetorical goals do these understandings potentially serve or undermine for producers? And, 
finally, where does intentionality fit in current conceptualizations of literacy sponsorship?  
 I begin by reviewing scholarship in the field of memetics, most notably from the work of 
Richard Dawkins, and current work in media theory responding to such notions of viral or 
memetic spread. I then invoke Goffman (1981) to propose a more fitting framework through 
which to understand the process mischaracterized as “viral” or “memetic” and the actors therein. 
Taking up Goffman’s production format of authorship, animation, and principalship, I juxtapose 
examples in which authors actively sponsor the recomposition of their texts; demonstrate less 
obvious goals for recomposition; or find animators appropriating their texts against their specific 
goals for recomposition. I consider how creators of said texts have been recovered by reporters 
covering memetic phenomena; have themselves fought to reclaim ownership of their texts; or, 
conversely, have themselves invoked metaphors of virulence to disclaim their sole authorship 
and contribute to a larger collective. Ultimately, the chapter will demonstrate how viral and 
memetic frameworks of composition as self-propagating shift our focus away from where it is 
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most properly situated: on the many activities, people, and rhetorical contexts that truly originate 
and instigate the spread of these texts. 
Memes as Viruses of the Mind: Dawkins and His Respondents 
 Though many now use the term meme to refer to digital content that is easy to reproduce 
or alter, Richard Dawkins originally introduced the concept of the meme in 1976 as an idea for 
mapping contemporary understandings of genetic replication onto theorizations of cultural 
transmission. He coins the term in the final chapter of The Selfish Gene (1976), a book focused 
on the role of genes in natural selection, and chooses the word meme  “to convey the idea of a 
unit of cultural transmission, or a unit of imitation,” drawing on the Greek mimeme, to capture a 
monosyllable that sounds a bit like “gene” (p. 192). His theory of the meme’s action, however, 
describes not simply the copying of genetic material but also a process of parasitism that changes 
genetic material:   
If a scientist hears, or reads about, a good idea, he passes it on to his colleagues and 
students. He mentions it in his articles and his lectures. If the idea catchs [sic] on, it can 
be said to propagate itself, spreading from brain to brain. As my colleague N. K. 
Humphrey neatly summed up an earlier draft of this chapter: ‘…memes should be 
regarded as living structures, not just metaphorically but technically. When you plant a 
fertile meme in my mind you literally parasitize my brain, turning it into a vehicle for the 
meme’s propagation in just the way that a virus may parasitize the genetic mechanism of 
a host cell.’ (p. 192).  
Here, Dawkins explicitly invokes the model of the virus as an explanation of the meme’s 
propagation. Though Dawkins urges that we “not think of genes as conscious, purposeful agents” 
(p. 196), he also credits them, and by extension memes, with being self-propagating, for “[j]ust 
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as genes propagate themselves in the gene pool by leaping from body to body via sperms or 
eggs, so memes propagate themselves in the meme pool by leaping from brain to brain via a 
process which, in the broad sense, can be called imitation” (p. 192). Dawkins specifically 
characterizes this process of memetic spread as one of self-replication rather than one in which 
the actors are consumer-readers who judge an idea worth passing on to others. He attributes 
agency to the ideas themselves and not to the people performing acts of invention or imitation in 
developing, articulating, and sharing the ideas.  
 In his 1993 essay “Viruses of the Mind,” Dawkins redirects his metaphoric focus from 
gene to virus and proposes computer viruses as a model for “informational epidemiology.” 
Robert Aunger (2002) similarly explains the transmission of memes through a description of the 
Michelangelo computer virus and the transmission of Kuru, a biological disease related to what 
is commonly termed mad cow disease (pp. 7-13). This work not only ties the meme to the virus 
but further underscores Dawkins’ portrayal of memes as spreading through their own agency. 
For example, Aunger presents the theory of memetics as the idea “that thoughts can think 
themselves” and an understanding of the meme that 
  begins by recognizing that many of our thoughts are not generated from within  
  our own brains but are acquired as ideas from others. What memetics argues is  
  that, once inside us, these thoughts then go to work for themselves, pursuing goals  
  that may be in conflict with our best interests. These ideas have their own interests  
  by virtue of having qualities that make them like biological viruses. (p. 2) 
While Aunger’s work focuses on portraying the meme’s supposed agency inside us, and often 
against us, Susan Blackmore (1999) goes even further and explicitly derides human agency 
itself, arguing that humans are nothing but “memeplexes” or “meme machines” and that, as a 
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species, we need to move beyond the idea of human agency.  
 Other scholars have met such notions with resistance, as memetics researchers have yet to 
identify a mechanism by which a meme could reproduce itself. Mark Jeffreys (2000), for 
example, asserts that “contagions, hosts, etc., are hopelessly inadequate tropes for discussing a 
presumed second replicator and a presumed second process of natural selection” (p. 228). In a 
similar critique, Jenkins et al. (2013) refer to this concept of self-replication as “oxymoronic” 
because “culture is a human product and replicates through human agency” (p. 19). As cultural 
anthropologists and linguists have argued in treating the term culture as a signifying process, 
culture is not only actively constructed, but also multiple and contested (Hallam and Street 1998; 
Street 2000; Wright 1997). As such, Rosaria Conte (2000) argues for treating people not as 
vectors of cultural transmission but as actors behind this process, and building on her work, 
Shifman (2013) contends that the undermining of human agency is not inherent to the meme 
concept itself but only to certain strains of its interpretation (p. 366). 
  Though the undermining of human agency may not be inherent to all understandings of 
the meme since Dawkins first coined the term,21 the concept of ideas as potentially contagious is 
not limited to the field of memetics. The conflation of the spread of ideas with epidemiological 
understandings of transmission also appears in applied mathematics research modeling “the viral 
propagation” of memes, ideas, ideology, and rumors based on compartmental modeling in 
infectious diseases (Bettencourt, Cintrón-Aias, Kaiser, Castillo-Chávez 2006; Kawachi 2008; 
Santonjaa, Tarazonaa, Villanueva 2008; Wang and Wood 2011). In popular culture, Christopher 
Nolan’s 2010 blockbuster Inception opens with this same premise, through Dom Cobb’s 
comparison of an idea to a highly contagious parasite almost impossible to eradicate from the 
brain: “What is the most resilient parasite? Bacteria? A virus? An intestinal worm? […] An idea. 
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Resilient – highly contagious. Once an idea has taken hold of the brain it’s almost impossible to 
eradicate. An idea that is fully formed – fully understood – that sticks; right in there somewhere” 
(Nolan 2010). In the context of Nolan’s film, we could attribute this direct access to the brain to 
the film’s approach to accessing the human subconscious through dreams. In this metaphor, the 
fast-spreading ideas of uncertain provenance and the epidemiological contamination of bodies 
are one. This view suggests that the ideas take hold without any rhetorical activity such as clear 
articulation or persuasion by a speaker/writer that is part of successfully communicating them or 
disagreement or misinterpretation by a recipient that may repel or dissipate them. The only actor, 
according to the metaphor, is the idea/text itself. 
 Over the last five years, scholars such as Henry Jenkins, Xiaochang Li, Ana Domb 
Krauskopf, Joshua Green, and Sam Ford have critiqued the biological metaphoricity of terms 
such as viral and meme, arguing that they confuse the actual power relations between producers, 
consumers, and properties. Jenkins et al. (2013) and Green and Jenkins (2011) have developed 
their critiques of these terms primarily in studies of audience and its role in appraising and 
ascribing value and worth through circulation—a role obscured through metaphors of virality 
and memesis that frame popular digital texts as self-propagating. I argue that conceptual 
frameworks of viral and memetic spread, like academic signifiers such as “sponsored writers,” 
often fail to distinguish the equally necessary interrelated activities of actors producing and 
actors spreading—and even appropriating—composition within contexts of circulation. While 
this effacement of agency clouds processes of production and authorship that could be of value 
to authors who might wish to receive credit for the creation of a popularly circulated text, it can 
also help to obscure authors who do not wish to be associated with their texts and to veil the 
social and/or economic interests behind promoting the spread of a text and its content; authorial 
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recognition is not always a goal in composition, as Goffman suggests by distinguishing the roles 
of author and principal.  
Restoring Agency: Goffman’s Production Format 
 How do we remedy this tendency to undervalue the agency of creators, distributors, and 
even sponsors of so-called viral textual spread? One solution lies in the work of the Goffman 
(1981), whose production format offers a way to capture the agency of participatory audiences in 
spreading a message and is, therefore, a useful tool in further flattening heretofore-vertical 
conceptions of sponsorship. Goffman differentiates the role of animator, or the “sounding box” 
through which utterances are made, from that of the author, who composes the words and 
sentiments uttered by the animator, and the principal, whose viewpoints and interests are 
represented by the words uttered. These roles are not necessarily fused in any communicative 
act; in fact, multiple parties can, and often do, fill them. According to Goffman, parsing out these 
roles illuminates the often multiple actors and interests behind what we often portray in the 
singular as a speaker:  “When one uses the term ‘speaker,’ it often implies that the individual 
who animates is formulating his own text and staking out his own position through it: animator, 
author, and principal are one” (p. 145). I take up Goffman then to push back against the 
misconception that, in mass text distribution, the speaker is the sole, or even dominant, 
superintendent of the composition. The animator and principal, in fact, are equally paramount in 
propelling the composition’s reception and, like the writer-consumers studied in Chapter Two, 
have their own interests, possibly divergent from or contradictory to, those of the text’s authors, 
in advancing the spread. 
 Differentiating these roles helps to examine the often multiple parties and stages involved 
in animating a message. Explaining what the process of animation can entail, Goffman writes: 
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   reciting a fully memorized text or reading aloud from a prepared script allows us to  
  animate words we had no hand in formulating, and to express opinions, beliefs, and  
  sentiments we do not hold. We can openly speak for someone else and in someone else’s  
  words, as we do, say, in reading a deposition or providing a simultaneous translation of a  
  speech – the latter an interesting example because so often the original speaker’s words,  
  although ones that person commits himself to, are ones that someone else wrote for him.  
  (pp. 145-146) 
In the previous chapter, for example, Babeland as a sponsor functioned as an author and 
principal as it modeled compositions in the SHINE giveaway for consumers to animate in order 
to spread its interests; as a principal as it called for sex-while-driving narratives for the Cobra 
Libre Giveaway; and as a partial animator (along with Facebook) as it provided its Facebook 
page space as a point of distribution. At the same time, the author of a narrative on Babeland’s 
Facebook page is clearly animating that narrative and representing his or her own interests and 
perspectives. The confluent and composite sponsorships of Babeland and Facebook help to 
illuminate how principalship, like authorship, can be multiple; both Babeland and Facebook 
share interests in writers participating on Facebook’s compositional platform (confluent 
sponsorship) in the examples in which the two sponsors simultaneously act on writers, 
combining their interests in identifiable authorship and sex-positivity to invite writers to identify 
themselves with Babeland’s products and values (composite sponsorship). In these processes of 
sponsorship, both Babeland and Facebook function as principals. As such, while the concept of 
the animator can inform our understanding of sponsored writers’ roles as social actors, the 
concept of principalship can further inform our understanding of sponsoring interests. 
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  In the example of Babeland, the retailer’s goals and intentionality as a principal were 
explicit and unambiguous, and its authorial origin seems clearly identifiable. In the following 
section, I will study a pair of examples in which these are less obvious. With both examples—the 
Philosoraptor macro22 (see Figure 3.4 below) and, again, of #AlexFromTarget—the spread of 
these seemingly authorless compositions was tagged by media or popular terminology as “viral” 
or “memetic”—thus self-propagating and potentially insidious in infecting changes in their 
human hosts. Bringing Goffman’s theories to bear, I will illustrate the complexities of 
understanding text circulation as an outbreak narrative with an index case, a patient zero. 
The Problem of Patient Zero: Authors, Principals, and Sponsorship in “Viral” Narratives. 
The Philosoraptor Macro 
 Although T-shirt company Lonely Dinosaur does not publish a mission statement, 
history, or “About Us” section to represent its brand, just a glance at the shirts on its home page 
shows a theme of message tees that largely use puns and other forms of wordplay  (see Figures 
A.1-2), often relying on somewhat esoteric terminology (see Figures A.3-4). One such example 
is the Philosoraptor, a portmanteau that combines the words “philosopher” and “velociraptor” 
over an image of a velociraptor, as it is portrayed in the Jurassic Park franchise. In the design, 
the dinosaur’s forelimb23 is digitally manipulated into an upturned position pressed to the chin 
that gives it a contemplative appearance (see Figure 3.5).  
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Figure 3.4      Figure 3.5 
The caption for the image reads, “This is the shirt that started the meme! We designed it in 2008, 
and when we put it online, the image took off and became a meme on 4chan. You can read about 
all that here.” 24 The “here” link directs the site’s visitors to Know Your Meme: Internet Meme 
Database site that identifies itself as documenting Internet phenomena such as viral videos, 
image macros, catchphrases, and web celebrities (knowyourmeme). Here, Lonely Dinosaur 
appeals to a third party with no obvious bias toward the company’s profits as a source of 
authority. Know Your Meme’s organization of individual memes’ histories through categories of 
“Origin,” “Spread,” and “Notable Examples” expresses an interest in identifying 1) an original 
producer, 2) how the text went “viral”, and 3) what variations to the text epitomize the meme. By 
charting the image’s rise in circulation, Know Your Meme thus assists Lonely Dinosaur in being 
credited as the source of the popularly disseminated design. 
  One could argue that Lonely Dinosaur’s effort to establish Philosoraptor’s origin within 
their company plays into the viral metaphor in working to establish a patient zero; yet I see the 
origin story of Know Your Meme as a challenge to that framework. The concept of a producer as 
a patient zero implies a singular origin of composition, potentially obscuring processes of 
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explicit collaboration or constellations of unrelated producers, and yet Know Your Meme is 
attuned to these possibilities. In the origin section of its page on Philosoraptor, Know Your 
Meme posts an initial sub-heading, “LonelyDinosaur T-shirt,” under which the site identifies the 
“original Philosoraptor” as created as a T-shirt design by Sam Smith, who registered the 
copyright for his design on October 8, 2008. According to the site, Smith revealed in an email 
exchange that the idea was conceived in early summer 2008, while the final image was not 
created until late summer, with T-shirts entering production in August or September 
(Philosoraptor). Smith relates, “It was inspired by our friend Devin, who was a philosophy major 
and was always hunched over his desk thinking, so we called him the philosoraptor. We had 
never heard of it before at the time, but apparently the joke had been made previously on the 
interwebs” (qtd. Philosoraptor). In its second subheading in the origin section, Know Your 
Meme goes on to indicate that the earliest known depiction of a Philosoraptor, a digitally 
manipulated still of a velociraptor from Jurassic Park holding a copy of Plato’s complete works, 
was posted via YTMND25 on March 30, 2007 (Figure 3.6). This first example received minor 
attention and was not regenerated on 4chan’s site.26 Instead, it was the Lonely Dinosaur design 
that took off: “One of the first archived instances of Philosoraptor macros on 4chan that has been 
archived occurred in a /b/ thread27 posted on February 18th, 2009, almost two months after the 
sharp rise in trend. The Philosoraptor text is clearly visible, followed by a blank exploitable in 
the second post” (Figure 3.7).  
  50 
 
      
Figure 3.6      Figure 3.7 
 
 Thus, the Philosoraptor t-shirt design illustrates how authorial sponsorship interest can be 
obscured even when the composers declare an interest in making themselves visible. Though the 
designers at Lonely Dinosaur created the concept and image behind the macro template, they did 
not necessarily encourage any literate activity beyond the brief consumption of the text. 
Although the users of 4chan not only turned the design into a template for writing but, further, 
created the rhetorical conventions for composing macros of the Philosoraptor’s often ironic 
ponderings, they do not necessarily gain advantage from it or seek to as they re-animate Lonely 
Dinosaur’s design (itself a reanimation of Jurassic Park’s portrayal of the velociraptor). While 
Smith and the designers at Lonely Dinosaur neither created the template for adding print text to 
the image nor invented the if/then-question syntax of the meme embodied therein, they do have 
both a financial interest in the recomposition of their Philosoraptor T-shirt design through 
consumers purchasing the print to wear and an interest in the social capitalism of being 
recognized as the author. When placed in conversation with the example of #AlexFromTarget, 
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Smith’s creation of Philosoraptor and 4chan’s appropriation of the design help to illuminate 
agency potentially obscured by the recompositions and resultant frameworks of viral spread. 
#AlexFromTarget Revisited  
  Reiff, the photographer of #AlexFromTarget, does not articulate directions or motives for 
her Twitter followers to retweet her photo, though she does upload it within a network that has 
the technological affordances to 1) quickly and easily reproduce another user’s texts exactly and 
2) track popular topics through hashtags and to display the most popular topics for those who 
may not yet be in on them. As such, the network constructs the act of posting something worth 
retweeting, let alone trending, throughout the network as valuable in constructing social capital.
 In creating #AlexFromTarget and Philosoraptor, Reiff and Smith are social actors, not 
simply afflicted or acted upon by a virus of the mind. In fact, several reporters covering the 
#AlexFromTarget story have cited the hashtag as evidence of the power of fangirls in arbitrating 
popular media. For example, Caitlin Dewey (2014a) of The Washington Post writes that “while 
it’s difficult, from a distance, to look at an inexplicably viral phenomenon like “Alex” and figure 
out how it happened, this sort of thing plays out within the teen fandom space more or less every 
week. These fandoms have enormous power over what goes viral.” I see this notion of power as 
being at odds, however, with the notion of virality, which obscures the rhetorical decisions of the 
composers and sharers. Dewey’s observation of the girls’ agency in this story is atypical in the 
early reporting of the story, in which, as later reporters noted, the girls’ agency disappeared, 
particularly in the conflicting claims of the image’s origin and intent. Kelsey McKinney (2014) 
reminds readers in Vox that “[t]he girls, really, are the ones lost in this story. Two 15-year-old 
girls took this picture that made Alex from Target’s fame, but they’ve received no attention. 
@auscalum, who made his image go viral, has only been chastised for taking credit for the 
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photo.” Rae Votta (2014b) similarly observes in Femsplain,  
  We’re celebrating a teen boy and a company (run by a man) all over the Internet, while   
  the girls who created this remain practically anonymous. @auscalum, the teen who did  
  the actual tweeting about Alex originally, locked down her Twitter for a while. She’s  
  already getting backlash, even though she’s the true cog of power in this situation. Alex  
  could have been any boy [.…] Page and Reiff have gained very little. Alex, the boy they  
  simply thought was cute, hasn’t even contacted them, let alone Target or Ellen Degeneres  
  or very many media outlets. 
Reiff composed a tweet to meet a specific audience interest, that of her friend’s interest in a local 
boy, which funneled outward into a much larger audience interest, that of young girls in teenage 
heartthrobs. Sam Smith and the other designers at Lonely Dinosaur created not just a concept or 
even a design but a portmanteau that fits an entire portfolio of designs, namely, a portfolio that 
uses wordplay to appeal to consumers of message tees. In both cases, these producers composed 
texts of value to others within an economy of composition, activity scholars can easily overlook 
in identifying writers as hosts to ideas rather then producers of them; unlike hosts of H1N1 or 
avian flu, these individuals are making choices of their investments, alignments, connections, 
and intentions. 
  In the case of #AlexFromTarget, for example, Page first brought up Alex’s looks, and 
Reiff followed up with the photo; Reiff produced the photo, but Page initiated the context and 
inspired the audience interest in it. That specific context, in turn, instantiates a larger context of 
teenage girls interested in teenage boys who draw their styles from One Direction, 5 Seconds of 
Summer, and Justin Bieber. Their creation of #AlexFromTarget was collaborative not only in the 
sense that Reiff composed her image-tweet in answer to Page’s previous tweet about Alex, but 
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also in the sense that their interest in Alex has been influenced by larger social-collective 
expectations. As LeFevre (1987) observes: 
  Invention is influenced by a social collective, a supra-individual entity whose rules  
  and conventions may enable or inhibit the invention of certain ideas. Even when an  
  individual appears to invent in isolation or with one or two others, she is also interacting  
  with social collectives. The locus of evaluation of what is invented, according to this  
  perspective, lies in this larger social unit, which can be a specific organization or more  
  abstract socio-culture. (p. 80) 
Alex is conventionally attractive and coiffed as per contemporary teenage trends. This is not to 
say that the girls’ attraction to him is not genuine but to observe that it is part of a greater social 
agreement about gendered norms and ideals for their age group, through which they frequently 
are taught or pick up on what is attractive. As John Dewey (1927) explains, “[i]ndividuals still do 
the thinking, desiring, and purposing, but what they think of is the consequence of their behavior 
upon that of others and that of others upon themselves” (p. 24). It is important to recognize, 
however, that the girls are not simply acted upon by collective values in their collaboration but 
actively constitute this social collective and act to perpetuate and reinforce its values. LeFevre 
emphasizes that “[i]nvention is a dialectical process in that the inventing individual(s) and the 
socioculture are co-existing and mutually defining” (p. 35). I emphasize here that the social 
collective dictating the norms that raise boys like Alex to popularity do not exist without the 
work of girls like Reiff and Page.  
  Of course, these compositions have gone “viral” within a set of constraints; I only learned 
of Alex from my study of circulating texts, and although I imagine many of my readers will not 
be familiar with him, within sectors of the teenage girl population (particularly among those 
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actively tuned into particular internet forums and associated fads), he has a large following.28 
Both the spread and the constraint of Alex’s popularity show how the users who made him 
popular did so by making use of available technological affordances to capitalize on rhetorical 
resources of assembled and aligned audiences. By creating and using the hashtag affordances of 
Twitter, users spreading the hashtag were able to reach beyond the audiences they already had 
assembled—the followers receiving their tweets—to audiences with aligned interests in 
following the hashtag and making use of it themselves. As users continued to employ the 
hashtag, the Alex craze grew further through Twitter’s affordance of showing “trending” 
hashtags—those most commonly used at the time, bringing in more people curious to see what 
#AlexFromTarget signifies. Those most interested in Alex carried his image over to social 
networks such as Tumblr and Instagram, where hashtag affordances allowed further alignment of 
interested audiences.  
  Outside of such aligned and assembled audiences, #AlexFromTarget did not enjoy the 
same popularity. As Lasswell (1959) argues, creative linkages among members of similar social 
contexts facilitate individual creativity (p. 221); this would, half a century later, be seen in the 
explosion of #AlexFromTarget. In spite of Lasswell’s findings, LeFevre’s research on invention 
and Lasswell’s work on creativity both identify understandings of authorship that may skew 
academic and lay understandings alike to focus on singular origins of authorship. LeFevre and 
Lasswell respectively cite the Platonic view of invention and individualistic tradition as leading 
us to look for creative individuals, “the da Vincis in prodigality of skilled expression, the 
Galileos in the march of human enlightenment” (Lasswell, p. 205) and to favor individualistic 
approaches to research and to neglect studies of writers in social contexts (LeFevre, p. 23).  In 
her work, LeFevre works to portray invention often as a process out of the mind of the individual 
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and in the interaction of real people, where it may be defined as an act, a response of another 
individual to an initiators’ gesture (p. 62). Lasswell further argues that the hidden complexities of 
the double process of innovation and recognition are among the factors that facilitate production, 
as evaluative norms are obviously involved in judging that a product or idea is of value (p. 206).  
  We see this double process of innovation and recognition at play in the participation in 
both #AlexFromTarget the uptake of appropriation of the Philosoraptor designs. Though Sam 
Smith identifies his design as “the shirt that started the meme” and cites Know Your Meme’s 
archive in documenting the concept’s origin and spread, both Smith and Know Your Meme 
recognize multiple origins of the concept. Although Lonely Dinosaur’s design specifically is the 
one that spread, both designers drew on the Jurassic Park franchise’s portrayal of the 
velociraptor, which made the “raptor” somewhat of a household name, an icon not only 
popularized but financially exploited in merchandise beyond the control of the actual franchise—
much like the case of Philosoraptor (see figures A.8-9). With both #AlexFromTarget and 
Philosoraptor, the audiences that have gone on to spread the messages are already assembled. 
Absent Jurassic Park and its many years of fandom, the Philosoraptor would not have taken off 
in the same way. As LeFevre proposes, invention builds on a foundation of knowledge (p. 34), 
or, I would add, cultural capital. The Philosoraptor macro was built off a resource, and the 
designers aligned with pre-existing audiences. There is a great deal of power of the people 
sharing this text to form a force whose needs the writers must meet in order to spread their 
compositions. 
  In fact, the role of audience alignment in spreading these texts demonstrates the 
multiplicity of principalship as a function in processes of recomposition. As individuals spread 
Philosoraptor and #AlexFromTarget, their actions of retweeting, hyperlinking, and so forth are 
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rhetorical acts of choosing to re-animate what they themselves take interest in spreading, 
demonstrating a dimension of principalship as well as animation. In the examples of 
Philosoraptor and #AlexFromTarget, we see authorship, animation, and principalship each as 
multiply distributed as Smith and his designers and Reiff and Page, respectively, collaborate to 
author texts in a process of animating already-popular cultural tropes that align with their 
interests, and as their animators in turn spread their shared interest in the cultural capital of a box 
office blockbuster or contemporary teen trends.  
  While both Lonely Dinosaurs’ and Reiff’s compositions build on existing cultural capital, 
not every design inspired by Jurassic Park takes off, as we see with the Philosoraptor holding 
Plato’s works, nor does every photo of a teenage boy with Justin Bieber hair. In both examples, 
authors created a specific text that appealed to large audiences. Together, Philosoraptor and 
#AlexFromTarget demonstrate how easy it is for authors of circulated texts to become 
obfuscated in the focus on the content of the text itself and to go unseen as texts circulate more 
and more widely from more and more sharers, particularly as sharers tweak the text. While 
Alex’s photo and Alex himself became famous on Twitter, even the reporters investigating the 
story struggled to identify the initial creators of the photo-Tweet. Perhaps more so than Reiff and 
Page, Sam Smith and Lonely Dinosaur have a vested interest in maintaining credit for their 
production; while all may benefit from the social capitalism of being recognized for their designs 
(Reiff now has over 1700 followers of Twitter), the Philosoraptor design concept originated as a 
way to sell T-shirts and thus has real-world economic implications for its designers, and it is to 
both their economic and authorial advantage to receive brand recognition, cultivate a business 
persona, and maintain sales for their now widely distributed and altered design. This 
composition, as far as its history discussed here details, did not come to the designer in the form 
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of a prompt or script and could arguably be interpreted more bound to the creator’s identity than 
the corporate-prompted identity-branding compositions addressed in the previous chapter. And 
yet the Babeland-prompted compositions acted to affirm identity, whereas Philosoraptor macros, 
through their propagation and understanding as a viral, memetic phenomenon, have acted to 
obscure Sam Smith and Lonely Dinosaur’s identity in concept production. If even a company 
with an economic interest can be mystified in the circulation of text, what happens when a 
sponsor does not want to be identified with the spread of its message, and how might the 
framework of virulence potentially color such situations?  
  The remainder of this chapter investigates these questions within the context of 
compositional recruitment. Within the conceptual framework of sponsorship,29 I use the term 
recruit to signify activities seeking out and recognizing the rhetorical skills and resources that 
another has to offer. In the case of my research, skill/resource is that of connecting to an 
established audience. In the next example, in contrast with those of the previous chapter, the 
sponsor’s interests and a spotlight on the writer’s agency in promoting that interest through said 
recruitment are at odds. Concealment, in other words, is actively preferred as clementine 
cannibal launches and recruits labor for a girl collective, as the writer does not portray it as a 
proprietary movement with themselves30 as the originator, and thus an effort based on their 
individual perspective. Instead, their use of numerous physical and digital anonyms to counter 
normative depictions of women helps to make these counter-perspectives appear as universal 
fact—a God trick, as Donna Harraway (1996) calls it—which would, in turn, help to make 
counter-discourse seem true. As noted earlier, I see such practices as a method of dislocating 
sponsorship, and I document in this case that frameworks of virulence are not simply conceptual 
tools for scholars to understand or explain the literate activities of sharing texts but resources that 
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individuals, collectives, or institutions can employ to define and construct their roles as sponsors 
in relation to their recruited producers and sharers. 
“come on, infect us all”: grrrlVIRUS and the Benefits of Dislocated Sponsorship 
   In the previous chapter, I observed that Babeland has an active interest in dislocating 
itself in its sponsorship of consumer discussion of its sociopolitical interests and products, both 
in promoting them to wider networks than Babeland might reach on its own and in supporting 
Babeland from a point of view that is not financially invested in its profits. These benefits of 
dislocation are ones that are also sought by clementine cannibal, creator of the social movement 
girlVIRUS. By employing what she identifies as infectious spread to separate herself from her 
role in initiating girlVIRUS, she is able to make the campaign appear less centered on her as an 
individual and more so as belonging of a variety of grrrls representing a collective who are 
reclaiming women’s worth. In both examples, these sponsors not only actively promote literate 
activity but actively recruit others to spread their interests. 
 Feminist activist, zinester, and musician clementine cannibal began girlVIRUS as a 
grassroots initiative to spread messages made by girls to counter popular portrayals of “what it 
means to be female, or how we are supposed to be women” and identifies such portrayals 
frequently not created by women but designed to make a profit from “mak[ing] us feel bad about 
ourselves” (see Figure 3.8). Through their blog, clementine cannibal works to reach a public 
beyond their readership by creating a digital database of these texts and encouraging readers to 
create and upload their own materials for others to distribute and to download and distribute 
materials from others. With a manifesto taken from Courtney Love, clementine cannibal lauds 
infection and correlates it with the internalization of subjugated points of view: “as courtney says 
‘come on, infect us all’. it’s time for grrrl’s [sic] voices to be heard and valued. it’s time to make 
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them listen” (clementine cannibal). This message is the epitome of girlVIRUS, a movement that 
not only takes up, but actively embraces the metaphor of virulence in the production, 
distribution, and consumption of composition and forwards virulence as a productive force in 
spreading ideology.  
  clementine cannibal’s reference to grrrls invokes the Riot Grrrls feminist movement of 
the punk underground in the early 1990s.31 The additional “r”s are designed to make the girls 
roar, representative of the riot grrrl emphasis on giving girls a voice. This, it was thought, would 
come largely through DIY ethics of women’s experiences embodied not only in music but also 
through zines (derived from magazine), independently- or self-published booklets typically 
created by cutting-and-pasting photocopies in a collage fashion.32 In fact, this style appears in the 
girlVIRUS sample flyers (see Figures 3.9 and 3.10 for examples). On the “girlVIRUS” page of 
their blog, clementine cannibal begins their conceptualization of girlVIRUS with a Courtney 
Love epigraph: “the VIRUS that tells me deep in my brainstem that i can be whatever it is that i 
want to be”. She explains that “the girlVIRUS is alive, mutating, infecting. i’m going to upload 
the girlVIRUS flyers made by me and other grrrls to this page, so you can print them out, 
photocopy them and spread them around your communities.” In this description, clementine 
cannibal portrays the girlVIRUS as spread through the composition, distribution, and 
consumption of flyers digitally and physically spread throughout virtual and geo-political 
communities: 
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Figure 3.8 
   
Figure 3.9            Figure 3.10 
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 In their call for submissions for “GRRRL VIRUS” flyers for 2011, they write, “with the 
new year fast approaching and the grrrlVIRUS spreading and mutating like crazy, it’s time for a 
new batch of flyers. i want you, grrrls, to design new flyers!” They organize this call into four 
sections: “what are grrrlVIRUS flyers?”; “how do you make a grrrlVIRUS flyer?”; “what 
happens with the grrrlVIRUS flyers?”; and “how do you submit?” This task breakdown reminds 
me of how I have formatted many of my classroom writing assignments in “What,” “How,” and 
“Why” sections to explain, respectively, the goals of the assignment; how students might carry 
out the pursuit of such goals; and why we are taking the time and energy to pursue these goals. It 
is a call that recruits and instructs its recipients on how to compose these texts. 
 In the first section, cannibal defines grrrlVIRUS flyers as flyers made by grrrls, which 
express grrrl creativity, solidarity, empowerment, and outspokenness.” cannibal elaborates: 
  we are constantly flooded with images and messages everyday about what it means to be  
   female, or how we are supposed to be as women. […] we want our voices heard. we want  
  to decide for ourselves what being a grrrl is all about, and we know it’s different for  
  every single one of us. we want to communicate with other grrrls and speak back to  
  sexists. 
This definition portrays grrrlVIRUS flyers as a way to make subjugated points of view heard. In 
turn, the framings of the virus and infection function to frame the spread of these perspectives as 
inevitable, as not only circulating, but as taking hold in the readers consuming them. According 
to clementine cannibal’s framing, the production and circulation of grrrlVIRUS compositions 
infects because the producers and consumers have already internalized images and ideologies of 
what it means to be female and how to be a woman. Infection, then, appears not simply as the 
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spread of texts but specifically the spread and uptake of counter-discursive understandings of 
what a woman is. 
  cannibal’s definition of the flyers identifies as the flyers’ purpose to spread grrrls’ voices 
[my italics], as opposed to solely cannibal’s own, though cannibal does provide examples of 
work that potential participants might produce and offers possible genres of composition that 
could promote the interests of a grrrl collective. Under the “how do you make a grrrlVIRUS 
flyer?” section, cannibal answers,  
  any way you want to. you can do collages, draw pictures, write shit by hand or print  
  it off a computer. you can write a manifesta, put song lyrics or quotes by grrrls you  
  love, you can write an open letter to other grrrls, or rant about sexism, you can talk  
  back, you can use pictures of your grrrlheroes, whatever you want. basically, i want  
  you to use your own voice, because each grrrl’s voice is different, and we need to  
  break open the boring monotonous narrow possibilities available to grrrls, and be  
  ourselves. 
The emphasis on mutating allows cannibal to use the framework of the virus to mean more than 
simply passing cannibal’s message on to grrrl after grrrl. Here, cannibal sees the potential of the 
viral metaphor in framing their movement as not simply spreading but evolving to fit the 
different needs of different women. Within this framework, however, there appears to be no 
distinction between the grrrls spreading the virus and those who consume their messages but do 
not become actively involved in spreading the ideology—or even feel compelled by it. Here, 
cannibal emphasizes a multiplicity of different voices to oppose the “monotonous narrow 
possibilities available to grrrls”; this chimes with the collective-but-multiform representation of 
women that lies at the core of cannibal’s larger project. By encouraging grrrls to use their voices 
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without attribution to cannibal’s, cannibal demonstrates a greater interest in collective authorship 
than in cannibal’s own; there is no evident need—and perhaps an outright refusal—to claim 
credit for coining the girlVIRUS concept, starting a movement, or advancing feminism. 
Exploiting the meme-as-virus metaphor to decentralize their role in the movement, cannibal 
benefits from the authorial effacement the metaphor brings about. 
  At some point between my focused analysis in late 2011 and fall 2012, clementine 
cannibal took the site down, though the girlVIRUS/grrrlVIRUS/theVIRUS Facebook page to 
which it was mutually linked remains active, and girlVIRUS posters remain posted across 
multiple tumblr pages (girlVIRUS/grrrlVIRUS/theVIRUS). Their new website identifies them as 
Clementine Morrigan and markets their work in art, essays, film, and poetry (see Figure 3.11). 
 
Figure 3.11 
When juxtaposed with this self-promotion, cannibal’s previous effacing of their role in creative 
girlVIRUS becomes a telling rhetorical strategy. This self-effacement helps to portray 
girlVIRUS as more organically spread, infectious, a self-propagating force, as opposed to an 
accomplishment of crafted work. In this way, making spread seem natural, if not inevitable, 
rather than rhetorically calculated is a rhetorical strategy for spreading the movement’s 
messages. As such, I contend that entailments of viral metaphors implicitly obscure not only 
  64 
writers’ agency in identifying ideas themselves as agents but also principals’ roles in promoting 
their interests through writing; by casting virulence as self-propagating, these frameworks 
explain the gain of recomposition as reproduction itself. With replication itself as the gain, the 
virus’s stand-in, the textual content, would appear to take on the role of the principal or sponsor, 
rather than the actual sponsors/principals. In this way, sponsors may actually be able to use viral 
metaphors to dislocate their sponsorship, and thus the role of their personal interests in 
promoting a specific text or message.  
The Production Formats of Recomposition and Viral Spread  
  In the examples of recomposition throughout this chapter, the initial authorial animus 
becomes more and more distant, distorted, or lost as the spread grows. Principalship also 
becomes obscured in these examples, though the principals’ interests are facilitated or forgotten 
to varying degrees across the cases examined. I argue, however, that the author and principal do 
not entirely overlap in all of the examples considered. While clementine cannibal superficially 
appears to provide a case that fits most neatly within the framework of sponsorship, Goffman’s 
separation of author and principal may work to complicate our view of sponsors’ gains. While 
cannibal promotes the spread of their personal interests, these are interests they further recognize 
as of value to others as well, making the principals of this example multiple as they fight for 
equity across constructions of gender and sexuality.  
  In the following chapter, I examine two sponsors who recruit writers to mediate messages 
for the specific interest of protecting the general public. I specifically examine National Institute 
of Mental Health and Center for Disease Control recommendations for reporting suicide in order 
to prevent suicide contagion to examine processes of sponsorship in which those consuming 
sponsored writers’ texts, rather than the sponsor, appear to be the primary principals. While 
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Chapter Three shows the action captured by viral metaphors and sponsors using viral metaphors 
to try to emulate that action, or even to make it happen, Chapter Four shows what can happen 
when we take the metaphor seriously to the point of conflating figurative and literal contagion in 
medical understandings. Through the following examples, I break down more explicit portrayals 
of viral metaphors by literacy sponsors that work shape how the participants they recruit view 
the activities, motives, and consequences of their decisions of attempting to facilitate or halt viral 
spread. These more literal understandings of composition as contagion build upon viral 
entailments of both 1) point-to-point spread of contagion and 2) the agency of contagion as 
infecting, focusing on specific content as particularly virulent (for example, the glamorization of 
suicide in news or social media). I argue that the high stakes of these examples, the co-
construction understandings of medical health and how writing functions between authors, 
animators, and consumers, underscores the necessity of interdisciplinary studies of 
recomposition to take into account other fields’ and social institutions’ take-up of our object of 
study—and how they may influence not only our research or lay non-academic writing practice 
but even understandings of phenomena that appear to have little to do with writing, such as the 
contemplation of suicide, because of the degree to which our lives are textually-mediated.   
                                                
21 For example, numerous scholars have noted that Internet users have picked up the concept of the meme in popular 
vernacular, and not necessarily with the same explicit focus on virulence as academics studying memes in relation to 
its origins (Knobel and Lankshear 2007, Shifman 2013, Wiggins and Bowers 2014). Shifman, for example, observes 
that Internet users have picked up the concept of the meme enthusiastically, despite the term being disputed in 
academia (p. 364). Knobel and Lankshear suggest that usages of the term between Internet users and academics 
differ, arguing although “[t]here are some broad surface similarities between theorized conceptions of memes within 
memetics and ‘popular’ appropriations of ‘meme’ as a word to describe particular ‘infectious’ phenomena (and 
which tends to conflate the message/idea and the idea ‘carrier’ or ‘vehicle’ under the same term)”, these similarities 
do not run very deep (p. 199). To them, the difference in usage and meaning appears to lie in longevity: “It seems to 
us very unlikely that many, if any, so-called internet memes of the kinds we talk about in this chapter will have even 
remotely the kind of shelf life and cultural influence that serious memeticists assign to memes” (p. 199). 
 
22 An image macro is an image superimposed with text, often for humorous or ironic effect. In Internet culture, 
image macros are commonly referred to as “macros” for short, and this is how I will use the term moving forward. 
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23 Jurassic Park enthusiasts have observed through their commentary and artwork that, while the placement of the 
Philosoraptor’s visible limb suggests that it is the animal’s forelimb, the large claw appears to portray the armature 
of the animal’s hind legs instead. In this project’s appendix, Figures A.5 and A.6 expand upon the Philosoraptor’s 
image to explain how the animal’s body would need to be positioned (in the case of Figure A.6, rather awkwardly 
and even erotically in what appears to be a satire classical art of the nude form) in order for her rear claw to reach 
her face in such a pose. Figure A.7 further revises the original design to portray more accurate fore claw. 
 
24 4chan began as an online bulletin board where anyone could post pictures and has since evolved to a community 
fostered by numerous participatory boards, many of them for specifically-themed content. As Sorgatz (2009) reports 
in his interview with 4chan’s founder, Christopher Poole that 4chan “is the direct or indirect source for many of the 
strangest internet memes: RickRolling, LOLcats, Sarah Palin's email hack, Anonymous, Chocolate Rain, and many 
other minor and major feats of esoterica (i.e., fucked up weird porn). Most of these viral specimens arose from the 
site's most popular image board, /b/, which can be the source of considerable hand-wringing and fist-clenching for 
anyone who has dared navigate its murky, anonymous waters.” 
 
25 YTMND stands for “You’re The Man Now, Dog”, a catchphrase from Sean Connery’s character in Finding 
Forrester. YTMND.com is a community where users generate pop-culture remixes and parodies, usually as still 
images or animated GIFs with overlay text and/or looped audio tracks. 
 
26 Sorgatz (2009) observes that “[o]ne of the most interesting things about 4chan is that nothing gets archived. 
Threads disappear within an hour. It's a contradiction—4chan is known for creating memes, yet it's designed for 
them to die so quickly.” In turn, Poole, 4chan’s founder, responds:  
  The lack of retention lends itself to having fresh content. The joke is that 4chan post is a repost of a repost  
  of a repost. There was a guy who was downloading every image from /b/. He calculated that 80 percent of  
  what's posted has been posted before. So it's survival of the fittest. Ideas that are carried over to the next  
  day are worth repeating. The things that are genuinely funny get carried over. 
 
  The reason we're seen as a meme generation factory is because of the unique qualities of the image board  
  and the lack of retention. On other bulletin boards, threads are archived indefinitely. All the big threads  
  have been around for months or years. But with 4chan, something has to be really good to keep getting  
  posted. 
This ephemeral quality to the bulletin boards may inform, in part, how the velociraptor holding Plato’s works did 
not seem to reappear after its initial post, even as uptake of the Philosoraptor template based on Lonely Dinosaur’s 
design exploded.  
 
27 In his interview with Sorgatz (2009), Poole explains the /b/ board’s origin, function, and reputation as such: “I 
was 15 years old and into anime. I threw up one image board, which was the original /b/. At first it was all anime. 
As people started posting other things, I added more boards and /b/ remained the random board. […] As people 
started posting other things, I added more boards and /b/ remained the random board. […] 4chan has blown up over 
the past five years. It's gone from 100 people to 4.75 million per month. And /b/ is pushing 100 million pageviews. 
[sic].” 
 
28 When I asked my 14-year-old sister whether she had heard of #AlexFromTarget, she responded, “um, yeah”, 
though she does not actually have Twitter—such is Alex’s popularity in her demographic. In fact, users of other 
social media networks such as Instagram circulated his image and organized a day to wear red for Alex at the public 
schools throughout her county. 
 
29 Recruitment is one of the many activities Brandt defines as sponsorship (1998, p. 166; 2001, p. 19). 
30 Clementine’s new website, under the name Clementine Morrigan, identifies the writer as genderqueer and refers 
to them through the singular them rather than feminine pronouns or the gender-neutral pronouns of ze, hir, etc. 
 
31 The inclusion of the band Hole, for which Courtney Love sang, in this movement is widely debated, and when the 
band is included, it is typically for reasons of genre similarity rather than shared political interest. 
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32 For further reading on the Riot Grrrls, see Sara Marcus’ (2010) Girls to the Front: The True Story of the Riot 
Grrrl Revolution and Marisa Meltzer’s (2010) Girl Power: The Nineties Revolution in Music.	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Chapter Four  
Containing Contagion: Medical Framings of Composition as Vector 
 
  On August 11, 2014, news of actor and comedian Robin Williams’s death spread rapidly 
across the Internet, particularly on social network sites such as Facebook and Twitter. In addition 
to simply sharing links to news articles reporting Williams’s death, admirers of the performer 
tweeted images from Disney’s Aladdin franchise, for which Williams famously voiced the 
character Genie in two films. Among these, tweets from the Academy of Motion Pictures Arts 
and Sciences and actress Evan Rachel Wood in particular garnered attention because of both the 
content and the posters’ large number of followers. Both tweets included images of Aladdin 
hugging the genie and were captioned with a line from the first film in which Aladdin declares, 
“Genie, you’re free” (see Figures 4.1 and 4.2).  
  
Figure 4.1 
 
  69 
 
Figure 4.2 
The quoting of this line implicitly linked freedom from servitude with death and was seen as a 
symbolic reaction to the widely suspected, though yet-unconfirmed, cause of Williams’s passing: 
suicide. 
  Citing the analytics site Topsy, Caitlin Dewey (2014b) of The Washington Post reported 
that as many as 69 million people may have seen the Academy’s image once it reached 270,000 
shares. While, in some ways, this electronic massing of public grief may be said to serve a 
therapeutic purpose for Williams’s legion admirers, Dewey contended that the tweet “violates 
well-established public health standards for how we talk about suicide,” citing Christine Moutier, 
chief medical officer at the American Foundation for Suicide Prevention: “If it doesn’t cross the 
line, it comes very, very close to it. Suicide should never be presented as an option. That’s a 
formula for potential contagion” (qtd. in Dewey).  
  This chapter examines the “well-established public health standards” that Moutier 
references. To combat the tendency toward what they allege is irresponsible and contaminating 
speech on the subject—to control textual spread that they see as quite literally contagious—
NIMH and the CDC have delivered a set of recommendations for media discourse, 
  70 
recommendations that, as outlined by the two groups, take suicide contagion to be the byproduct 
of specific suicide-reporting practices. With the recommendations, NIMH and the CDC work to 
shape what information and affect reach the public through composers of news articles, 
television broadcasts, blogs, and message boards; the institutions demonstrate an interest in 
instructing not only the writers they influence but also the audience these writers reach. As such, 
NIMH and the CDC intervene in channels of mass communication of suicide reporting by 
recruiting writers with already-assembled audiences to both spread and stifle (Kawachi 2008) the 
specific messages those institutions wish to advance. 
  If literate activity is about nothing less than ways of being in the world (Prior and Shipka 
2003), then how we understand literate activities shapes how we understand our everyday lives 
through a multitude of textually mediated experiences and phenomena. As the examples of 
NIMH and the CDC illustrate, institutions beyond academia actively frame what writing is and 
what it does, creating both tacit and explicit understandings of how people do, can, and should 
interact with writing as a technology. In the cases examined, understandings of how writing 
works and what writing does affect how medical professionals understand literally life-of-death 
stakes of everyday exposure to news reports or social network profiles. In these examples, 
understandings of medical health appear to be at least partially predicated on understandings of 
composition: if compositions function as a vector, transmitting ideas like viruses, then minds can 
become contaminated with contagion through the consumption of texts. 
  Both NIMH’s and the CDC’s portrayals of reporting suicide present the transmission of 
ideas through a signification system such as language as acting not only as a vehicle, in 
transporting a meaning from point A to point B, but as a vector that transmits a meaning with a 
reproductive capacity. As such, these writing guides’ sponsorship of literate activity evidences 
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assumptions of an epidemiological transmission and replication as underlying the sharing and 
spread of composition. I have argued in Chapter Three that virulent metaphors have limitations 
for understandings of recomposition, in that they passivize textual consumers, and yet the 
composition-as-contagion formulation is too entrenched (in the English language, at least) in our 
understanding of communication in general and in the language in which such understanding is 
conceived and expressed to propose eliminating the metaphor from our studies of writing. So 
settled is the framing, in fact, that in analyzing NIMH’s and the CDC’s depictions of self-harm 
as a disease that is actually spreadable through verbal and written communication, I find that 
there is no clear terminology to distinguish this phenomenon from epidemiologically 
communicable disease. Significantly, the spoken and written word itself appears to be a 
biological vector of such infection. Because the concept of communicability has defined human 
interactions in the cases of both information and of disease since the 1600s (online OED 
“Communicable”), it is difficult even to find terminology to replace what we might typically 
term “communication” in terms of conversation or monologue in trying to isolate understandings 
of the spread of textual communications from those of the spread of communicable disease. As 
Cynthia Davis (2002) writes, “[c]ontagion and writing are both forms of communication” (p. 
829). Furthermore, metaphors for understanding recomposition through frameworks of virulence 
are conceptually interlinked with typical understandings of verbal communication frequently 
critiqued for reducing the complexity of social interaction: Reddy’s (1979) conduit metaphor. 
  In the previous chapter, I challenged the virality tag often misapplied to phenomena of 
mass and quick-spreading recomposition. At the same time, in exploring the consequences of 
this misconstruction for the sponsoring interests of so-called viral compositions, I acknowledged 
and depicted how certain literacy sponsors deliberately exploit this mislabel to shroud 
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themselves as the originator of the spread. The intended audiences for their writings, however, 
were narrow, targeted, and primarily self-selecting. In the current chapter, I extend this analysis 
of literacy contagion by looking at NIMH and the CDC as two sponsors that literalize the 
metaphor of contagious spread by framing suicide ideation as actual medical contagion. The 
institutions invoke metaphors of virulence not simply as a rhetorical strategy to incite 
recomposition but further as in compositions they portray as contagions. Here, then, my study 
expands to consider the view of compositional contagion as a real-world bearer of malady rather 
than simply as a figurative condition of principalship in order to underscore the stakes of how not 
only writing scholars but publics at large understand processes of recomposition. 
 I begin with a brief theoretical background of the conduit metaphor, a concept that 
uncovers implicit understandings of language as a vehicle of meaning within the English 
language. To consider how—at least, within the context of suicide ideation—verbal 
communication is understood not simply as a carrier of meaning but a vector of meaning with its 
own agency, a contagion that infects and reproduces itself, I review literature credited by the 
CDC for informing its recommendations and finally examine the recommendations themselves 
as they articulate this logic of compositional contagion to a writing public. Ultimately, I ask how 
these examples help to illuminate the entailment of metaphors of sponsorship and viral spread as 
they both inform each other and, at times, potentially contradict each other’s portrayals of how 
texts spread. In doing so, I renew the claim that viral metaphors entail a threefold obscuring: not 
only of authors and animators as actors, by identifying ideas themselves as agents, but also of 
principals, by framing contagious concepts themselves as the actors gaining within a framework 
of self-propagating contagion. How might the examples of NIMH and the CDC, which 
simultaneously invoke metaphors of contagion while actively sponsoring writing in the interest 
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of protecting the consumers of their sponsored writers’ texts, help us to develop richer, more 
complex understandings of gains within the traditionally economic conceptualization of 
sponsorship? 
From Vehicle to Vector: Scaffolding Understandings of Viral Metaphors from the 
Framework of the Conduit Metaphor  
  In 1979, three years after Dawkins proposed the concept of the meme, Michael Reddy 
fleshed out the concept of the conduit metaphor, which he observed as implicitly—and 
problematically—underlying understandings of communication in the English language through 
common scripts, such as a person having to get his or her thoughts across or give someone an 
idea (p. 286). Reddy argues that such scripts of how humans transact ideas suggest (to English 
speakers) that language functions like a conduit, transferring bodily from one person to another 
(p. 290). Scholars such as Lakoff and Johnson (1980) distilled Reddy’s conduit metaphor as 
“entail[ing] that words and sentences have meanings in themselves, independent of any context 
of speaker” (p. 11). That is, the understanding of language as a conduit for meaning does not take 
into account differences in interlocutors’ situations, contexts surrounding conversations, or even 
vocal tone, body language, or written punctuation that shape the tone of language, all variables 
that shape communicatory transactions. Understanding language as a conduit is predicated on the 
misassumption that units of language—words, phrases, sentences—have a single inherent 
meaning that transcends contextual and tonal discrepancy and may as such be given over to 
another as if in a pristine container. This leaves little conceptual room for the inevitable 
miscommunications that enter into these interactions and affect the understanding between 
speaker and audience, thus effacing the agency of both the producer and receiver of messages in 
encoding and decoding meaning. 
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While Reddy proposes that understanding language as a conduit is an implicit assumption 
among English language users, I observe similar assumptions invoked more explicitly in 
metaphors of contagion. For a medical institution to identify writing as contagion is to cast 
writing as a physiological force beyond the cognitive processes required to make sense of text, 
further framing a compliance in reading. What room is left to disagree, ignore, forget, or be 
unaffected? While language as a conduit, as noted above, assumes an inherent meaning 
transferred in communication, communication as viral, contagious, or infectious further assumes 
an inherent spreadable quality, with the “contagions” propagating themselves when speakers do 
so much as encounter them, and an insidious transference to and beyond the immediate audience. 
To invoke virulence, contagion, or infection, then, is to exceed the confines of the conduit 
metaphor: whereas the latter implies the successful delivery of a message from producer to 
receiver, the former also ascribes agency and spreadability to ideas themselves.  
  It is worth considering whether the entailments of the conduit metaphor limit our 
understandings of communication to a degree that makes it, as a conceptual framework, more of 
an obstacle than a tool for studying talk and writing. Eubanks (2001), for one, argues that we 
need not throw out the conduit metaphor based on its supposed limitations. Building on Lakoff 
and Johnson’s research on conceptual metaphors as operating as part of larger conceptual 
systems (Lakoff 1996; Lakoff and Johnson 1999), Eubanks emphasizes that we cannot gain 
important insight into a single metaphor without also considering the metaphors that support it 
and to which it responds (p. 94). The conduit metaphor is one such example, a composite of 
multiple sensorimotor experiences; these include sight as a channel into acquiring knowledge, 
the metaphor of seeing another person’s view. Eubanks elaborates that, as speakers, we do not 
imagine that this component of the conduit metaphor “unproblematically” describes every act of 
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communication, as “we are forever reading between the lines [italics original]” (pp. 106-107). 
Here, Eubanks works to demonstrate that just because we understand something as operating 
through a certain metaphorical framework does not mean that we are incapable of understanding 
the framework’s limitations or of extending the metaphor to complexities within its framework. 
To continue the visual metaphor, although we might presume to understand language as 
something seemingly transparent, we do not necessarily assume that we will never need to look 
closer at this material to read the fine print, as another visual metaphor puts it, in order to process 
it. 
  Eubanks, however, frequently focuses on successful communication as specifically made 
possible by the volitional choices of a successful rhetor. As he represents communication 
through a number of sensimotor experiences from touch to sight, he repeatedly ascribes 
communication breakdowns to the speaker’s failure to capture meaning, paint an accurate 
picture, or choose accessible, direct, straightforward, and pointed language. Throughout what he 
titles a “defense of the conduit metaphor,” he does little to address the possibility that the 
rhetor’s interlocutor(s) are potentially distracted, engaged in bad faith, somehow lacking in 
comprehension, or otherwise even partly responsible for miscommunication.  
  Up to this point in this dissertation, I have examined channels of communication as 
mediated by animators between author and audience as well as the limitations of the metaphors 
we use to understand these phenomena. I now interrogate the consequences of sponsors actively 
deploying metaphors of virulence to intervene in existing channels of communication. In these 
examples, NIMH and the CDC invoke not simply the entailment of point-to-point spread 
involved in metaphors of virulence, but also that of an external power acting on textual 
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consumers, as pathogens act on their hosts, and specifically an pathogenic power that, unlike the 
grrrlVIRUS described in the last chapter, does harm to its host. 
Theoretical Framings of Ideas as Contagious: A Literature Review from the CDC 
  The CDC website projects an air of authority in its coverage of proper and improper 
practices for reporting suicide. The page listing recommendations for reporting suicide proclaims 
in its subtitle that these are “Recommendations from a National Workshop,” one that, the site 
reports, featured suicidologists, public health officials, researchers, psychiatrists, psychologists, 
and news media professionals who had gathered to address general concerns about and specific 
recommendations for reducing the possibility “of media-related suicide contagion.” The 
“National Workshop” in question, though, took place in 1989; it was confronting media threats 
for a different generation, in a far less diffuse media climate. Though a majority of the articles 
generated through the meeting focus specifically on youth and adolescents, today’s adolescents 
were not yet born at the time of this research. The publications that appear in the 
recommendation’s reference list dates as far back as 1985, and none were more recent than 1993. 
None of the recommendations were made in a context where the public Internet and social media 
existed.  
  In one of the CDC’s cited texts, Lucy E. Davidson and Madelyn S. Gould (1989) describe 
medical researchers and practitioners as struggling with the task of recognizing susceptible 
individuals beforehand, which Harry Bakwin (1957) distinguishes as “the sole approach to the 
youth suicide problem.” Davidson and Gould define suicide contagion as “a hybrid term that 
appends to suicide the medical meaning of contagion as the transmission of a disease through 
direct or indirect contact” (p. 88). They further argue that the term “copycat suicide” trivializes 
the many other factors contributing to suicide, in that “[t]he simplistic notion that one person 
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merely copied another’s suicide does not explain why the suicide was copied by that particular 
individual and not be [sic] hundreds of others who were similarly exposed” as “[e]xplaining 
cluster suicides by imitation alone does not take each decedent’s susceptibility and stresses into 
account” (p. 91). While imitation does not account for individual susceptibility and stress, they 
postulate that “applying the infectious disease model to suicide contagion can clarify from whom 
and through what sorts of contact the likelihood of suicide is increased,” arguing that 
components of the infectious disease model of host susceptibility, modes of transmission, degree 
of virulence, and dose dependency are analogous factors of suicide contagion (p. 88). I provide 
an overview of each of these model components below.  
  Host Susceptibility. Davidson and Gould define host susceptibility as measuring an 
individual’s intrinsic ability to resist illness; they illustrate this factor with the example of an 
immunized child who does not contract measles even if exposed to an outbreak (p. 88). They 
explain that host susceptibility to suicide is multiplely determined, with genetics playing a part, 
as some forms of depression have a strong genetic component, and depression is a common 
antecedent of suicide.  
  Modes of Transmission.  Davidson and Gould explain that modes of transmission can be 
direct, as in person-to-person, or indirect: 
  [p]erson-to-person spread may be implicated in subsequent teen deaths following the    
  suicide of another member of the same social network. The suicide of someone famous,  
  such as Marilyn Monroe, may be an indirect exposure to suicide for millions of people.  
  Thus, various suicide contagion pathways may exist: direct contact or friendship with a  
  victim, word-of-mouth knowledge, and indirect propagation through the media. (p. 89) 
  Degree of Virulence. Davidson and Gould point out that infective agents are different in 
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their degree of virulence; beta-hemolytic streptococci, for example, are more virulent than other 
types of streptococci. They postulate that “for youth suicide, the virulence of the agent may be 
greater when the first death in a potential cluster is that of a highly esteemed role model, such as 
the class president, rather than a loner who was always perceived as odd or disturbed” (p. 89).  
 Dose Dependency. Davidson and Gould relate the concept of dose dependency to suicide 
through an analogy of eating salad contaminated with staphylococci: while not all persons who 
consume the salad will get food poisoning, those who had two helpings are more likely to 
become ill than those who took a single taste. They suggest that “[t]he risk to an individual youth 
for suicide may increase as the number of suicides increases in his or her peer group or in the 
community” and that “[t]he seventh youth suicide in a widely publicized series of seven is likely 
to have been more exposed to suicide than his predecessors and, in effect, to have received a 
higher dose” (p. 89).  
Theoretical Implications of Ideas as Contagion: Deconstructing the Metaphor 
  As Davidson and Gould carefully work through each component of the infectious disease 
model to correlate it to suicide, they draw a series of sub-metaphors to substantiate the larger 
metaphor of suicide contagion. In discussing not simply susceptibility but specifically host 
susceptibility, they do not explain how ideas of suicide themselves act to parasitize and prey on a 
human as a host. This same critique applies to the scholars’ comparisons of word-of-mouth 
communication to person-to-person communication of disease; of the suicide of the class 
president with that of a loner,33 of how order or the person’s esteem relate to varying degrees of 
virulence of different types of streptococci; and of increased publicity to increased viral dosage. 
All of these examples rely on tropic similarities rather than detailed explanations of a mechanism 
wherein words enable words to prey on a host. As Bashford and Hooker (2001) observe, 
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contagion “implies absorption, invasion, vulnerability, the breaking of a boundary imagined as 
secure, in which the other becomes part of the self. Contagion connotes both a process of contact 
and transmission, and a substantive, self-replicating agent, and is centrally concerned with the 
growth and multiplication of this agent” (p. 4). How is it, then, that the metaphor of contagion 
appears to so neatly fit without an explanation of the supposed agency of articulated ideas in the 
ability to replicate in a host body?  
  Davis (2002) points out that contagion has a peculiar ability to be both content and 
method, “both disease and the process of its spread,” and, as such, offers a compelling analogy 
or metaphorical shortcut to portrayals of spread (p. 830). I posit that the need for such a shortcut 
in explaining how the concept of reporting as contagion may result from difficulties in studying, 
let alone evidencing, the spread of ideas as a contagion. Davidson and Gould acknowledge that a 
major constraint in examining the impact of media coverage of suicides is that such a study 
cannot demonstrate whether the suicide victims were actually exposed to the media events (p. 
94). If, the complexities of its effects aside, the mere fact of exposure to media coverage is 
difficult to confirm, why do NIMH and the CDC train such effort on scripting reporting 
guidelines?  
  Patrick O’Carroll, listed as a member of the CDC staff responsible for preparing the 
report of recommendations and cited for his publication, “Suicide Causation: Pies, Paths, and 
Pointless Polemics,” may provide an answer. O’Carroll (1993) observes that, to a large extent, 
most medical and scholarly attention in what causes suicide derives from our interest in 
preventing suicide (p. 29); he further argues that suicide always has multiple causal components 
working together and that, in order to prevent a particular suicide, researchers do not need to 
identify and understand all of the causal components at work. To back this, O’Carroll summons 
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the metaphor of a car engine: “Few of us know how an internal combustion engine really works. 
But most of us, if properly motivated, could devise any number of ways of preventing an engine 
from operating” (p. 30). O’Carroll further challenges the assertion that suicide prevention should 
focus on the causal elements most strongly associated with suicide by observing that some causal 
elements may be far more amenable to intervention than the element that is most strongly 
associated with suicide (p. 34). Although suicide is often connected to emotionally traumatic life 
events, he notes, there is little chance to eliminate such events in suicide prevention efforts (p. 
35). Based on O’Carroll’s argument, the potential facilitating factor of textual portrayals of 
suicide deaths and methods used appears far easier to control than factors such as traumatic life 
events.  
  Although this theoretical representation helps to inform us why NIMH and the CDC 
work to influence reports of suicide, it does not necessarily explain how either institution 
understands writing to operate as contagion or what it means for these institutions to portray 
writing as contagion. Davidson and Gould critique the term copycat suicide as trivializing the 
many factors that contribute to suicide by arguing that imitation does not account for individual 
susceptibility to external influence, and yet I question how a framework of contagion more 
accurately captures such other factors motivating suicide. In fact, I see the framework of 
contagion as erasing motivation from suicide, as motivation informs choices for actions, and thus 
agency. Imitation is one form of action. Contagion, however, leads not to choice or action but to 
symptoms and afflictions. As I review the data from NIMH and the CDC, I find that virulent 
frameworks of contagion not only obscure agency in terms of composing and spreading 
composition, as I argued in the previous chapter, but even shape understandings of other roles of 
human agency based on our participation in textually mediated experiences; in the case of this 
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study specifically, these frameworks assist in framing suicide itself as the effect of disease rather 
than an act an individual chooses.  
Suicide as “Contagion”: Constructing a Communicable Threat to the Public 
 The CDC recommendations for reporting suicide list some aspects of media messaging 
thought to promote contagion and briefly explain how these may negatively influence 
consumers, while NIMH recommendations are organized into “Do”s and “Don’t”s elaborated in 
“Instead of This” and “Do This” advice columns for reporters to follow “suicide contagion” 
guidelines (see Figure 4.3).  
Figure 4.3 
In this document, NIMH states that “the way media cover suicide can influence behavior 
negatively by contributing to contagion or positively by encouraging help-seeking”; suicide 
contagion occurs “when one or more suicides are reported in a way that contributes to another 
suicide.” Here, NIMH stresses reporters’ agency in composing, presenting reporters with a 
  82 
choice to spread or halt contagion based on their adherence to compositional guidelines. By 
deriving its definition from the reportage of suicides by media rather than from the imitation of 
other suicides by individuals, NIMH skews the attribution of responsibility toward speech and 
away from action—away from those who take the decision to end their lives. Furthermore, in 
pathologizing suicide as potentially contagious through textual exposure, NIMH frames 
multimodal reporting in newspapers, online news articles, and television news stories as carriers 
of contagion that do not catch the condition themselves but can pass it on to others.  
  NIMH presents this framework as applying beyond professional reporters to anyone 
writing about suicide in any public capacity. In “Suggestions for Online Media, Message Boards, 
Bloggers and Citizen Journalists,” NIMH asserts that “[t]he potential for online reports, 
photos/videos and stories to go viral makes it vital that online coverage of suicide follow site or 
industry safety recommendations.” In this section, NIMH explains that “[s]ocial networking sites 
often become memorials to the deceased and should be monitored for hurtful comments and for 
statements that others are considering suicide. Message board guidelines, policies and procedures 
could support removal of inappropriate and/or insensitive posts.” Similarly, “[b]loggers, citizen 
journalists and public commentators can help reduce risk of contagion with posts or links to 
treatment services, warning signs and suicide hotlines.” The following table (Table 4.1) 
organizes related aspects of reporting identified as contagions by both institutions with the 
recommendations NIMH provides to avoid such contagion: 
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Table 4.1 
“aspects of news 
coverage that can 
promote suicide 
contagion” (CDC) 
“Instead of This” 
(NIMH) 
“Do This” (NIMH) Analysis of These 
Examples as a Group  
* Providing 
sensational coverage 
of suicide. 
* Glorifying suicide 
or persons who 
commit suicide. 
* Focusing on the 
suicide completer's 
positive 
characteristics. 
* Engaging in 
repetitive, ongoing, or 
excessive reporting of 
suicide in the news. 
* Big or 
sensationalistic 
headlines, or 
prominent placement  
* Describing recent 
suicides as an 
“epidemic” 
“skyrocketing,” or 
other strong terms. 
* Including 
photos/videos of the 
location […] of death, 
grieving family, 
friends, memorials or 
funerals. 
* Inform the audience 
without 
sensationalizing the 
suicide and minimize 
prominence (e.g., 
“Kurt Cobain Dead at 
27”). 
* Carefully 
investigate the most 
recent CDC data and 
use non-sensational 
words like “rise” or 
“higher.” 
* Use school/work or 
family photo 
Concerns about 
sensationalizing, 
glorifying, and 
increasing 
viewer/reader 
preoccupation with 
suicide by associating 
suicide with affects of 
excitement, glory, 
praise, memorialism, 
etc.  
* Reporting “how-to” 
descriptions of 
* Including 
photos/videos of the 
* […] include hotline 
logo or local crisis 
Concerns for 
instructing suicide 
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suicide. location or method 
[…]. 
phone numbers. method  
* Presenting 
simplistic 
explanations for 
suicide. 
* Describing a suicide 
as inexplicable or 
“without warning.” 
*Quoting/interviewing 
police or first 
responders about the 
causes of suicide. 
* “John Doe left a 
suicide note saying...”. 
* Most, but not all, 
people who die by 
suicide exhibit 
warning signs. 
Include the “Warning 
Signs” and “What to 
Do” sidebar (from p. 
2) in your article if 
possible. 
* Seek advice from 
suicide prevention 
experts. 
* “A note from the 
deceased was found 
and is being reviewed 
by the medical 
examiner.” 
Concerns for sources 
of information outside 
of NIMH or CDC, 
including 
interpretation of 
causes of suicide, 
interpretation 
presence of warning 
signs, interviews with 
police, family, 
friends, or 
documentation from 
the deceased.  
Table 4.1 (cont.)  
  Both NIMH and the CDC recommend against detailing suicide method, which could 
instruct those considering suicide, and against the sensationalization and glamorization of death, 
which could make suicide seem alluring. Of the former, CDC and NIMH recommendations 
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respectively identify “[r]eporting ‘how-to’ descriptions of suicide” and “[i]ncluding 
photos/videos of the location or method of death” as aspects of reporting that can contribute to 
suicide contagion. What both institutions label as “contagion” could also be understood in a 
more straightforward way as a matter of instruction—the possibility of incidentally teaching 
methods of suicide through narrative or photographic details of methods that have been carried 
out.34  
   Contemporary suicide literature offers some evidence for re-reading accounts of 
contagion as, at least in part, issues of instruction/learning. For example, while arguing that 
suicide contagion is a genuine phenomenon, Becker et al. (2004) also acknowledge alternative 
terms and frameworks such as the “imitation hypothesis,” “suggestion theory,” “disinhibition 
effect,” and, “imitational learning” (p. 111). Stack (2003) argues that while associations are 
drawn between the reporting of suicide in news media and a rise in the social suicide rate, it 
typically is not known to what extent the people committing suicide are even aware of the 
suicide story. Describing the associations as “indirect” and “not fully satisfactory” (p. 238), 
Stack notes that the most direct evidence has come from reports, for example, of the role of a 
guide to suicide for the terminally ill being present at the location of a number of suicides and of 
a statistical increase in particular methods of suicide that the book detailed. Another report noted 
again an increase in method (hanging) following a media report of a suicide by hanging. Stack 
did not indicate that either of these reports found an overall increase in the suicide rate.  In any 
case, it appears that the most direct evidence tying media coverage  of suicide to suicides could 
be taken as evidence of instruction.  
 Stack reviews three major theories used for interpreting these associations (p. 238). First, 
Stack observes explanations of media impacts on suicide as generally framed in terms of social 
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learning theory, in which “one learns that there are troubled people who solve their life’s 
problems (for example, divorce, terminal illness, dishonor) through suicide. Mentally troubled 
persons in society may simply copy the behavior of troubled people in the suicide stories” (p. 
238). He then identifies the learning process of differential identification as suggesting that, “to 
the extent that people identify with a type of story, that type would be expected to have more of 
an impact. For example, if people tend to copycat the suicides of superior people, they would be 
expected to copy the ones of famous celebrities more than the suicides of ordinary people” (p. 
238). Finally, he discusses an explanation not of the characteristics of the message but of 
audience mood, which suggests that suicide stories “that appear when suicidogenic conditions 
are high in society (for example, high unemployment, high divorce rates, low church attendance 
rates) will have more of a copycat effect since more people are on the verge of suicide”, which 
he cites as the most understudied explanation. (p. 238). Stack’s review acknowledges that studies 
of suicide contagion have faced methodological challenges and that the empirical evidence has 
been complicated (i.e., lots of contextual effects) and somewhat mixed. For example, if there is a 
statistically significant uptick in the number of suicides in a certain period after a major media 
story of a suicide, it is difficult methodologically to determine if the change represents a change 
in the number of suicides or in the timing, or as noted earlier, in method of suicide.  
  In addition to concerns about instructing methods of suicide, both NIMH and the CDC 
express concerns of audiences identifying with positive portrayals of those who have committed 
suicide appear in NIMH and CDC guidelines as they list “[g]lorifying suicide or persons who 
commit suicide,” “[f]ocusing on the suicide completer's positive characteristics,” and “[b]ig or 
sensationalistic headlines, or prominent placement” as further aspects of reporting that drive 
contagion. The CDC notes that suicide reportage sometimes associates the act with honor or 
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praise, which, the CDC reasons, might not only facilitate suicide preoccupation but further cast 
suicide in a positive light for viewers. For the CDC, community expressions of grief, such as 
public eulogies, flags flown at half-mast, and permanent public memorials, are potential 
contributors to suicide contagion “by suggesting to susceptible persons that society is honoring 
the suicidal behavior of the deceased person, rather than mourning the person's death.” The CDC 
further remarks that “[e]mpathy for family and friends often leads to a focus on reporting the 
positive aspects of a suicide completer's life,” and, “[a]s a result, […] suicidal behavior may 
appear attractive to other at-risk persons—especially those who rarely receive positive 
reinforcement for desirable behaviors.” The fear described here is that reportage not simply 
reveals suicide methods but further impart the lesson that suicide reaps positive value and 
secondary gains such as appreciation. According to the CDC, repeating suicide stories on a 
seemingly endless media loop poses the greatest threat to “at-risk” individuals, whose 
preoccupation with suicide may increase. The solution to this, the CDC puts forward, is “by 
limiting, as much as possible, morbid details in their public discussions of suicide.” All of these 
concerns fit with theories of social learning and differential identification as Stack describes 
them. Still, in one of its pronouncements on the relationship between mass preoccupation with 
suicide, as disseminated through media, and actual incidences of suicide, the CDC again casts its 
discourse specifically in terms of epidemiology: “This reaction is also believed to be associated 
with contagion and the development of suicide clusters.”  
 While suicide statistics may yield clusters, the CDC reporting guidelines do not 
document a clear leap from “clusters” to “contagion”—from correlation to causation—as they 
portray reporters’ roles in spreading or preventing said contagion. That is not to say that 
literature in suicide-related research does not work to document the interrelation of these terms 
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as conceptual frameworks. Cheng et al. (2014) argue that despite the increasingly common 
invocation of the term contagion to analogize the spread of suicidal thoughts, behaviors, and 
deaths, “there has been scant effort to rigorously assess the underlying concept or theory 
supporting the use of this term, or appraise its practical utility” (p. 1). As they review literature 
published as of April 4, 2013 to obtain a comprehensive picture of the academic use of contagion, 
they find that, for the specific use of contagion-as-cluster, studies lack specification or agreement 
regarding the measurements of time, spatial distance, and social distance that qualified as “acute” 
or “proximate” enough to connect the suicides they studied, arguing that, “[w]ithout either a 
priori standardization or empirical demonstration of metrics for time, space, or social connection, 
the process for defining connection or contact becomes potentially unreliable” (p. 2). They 
further observe:  
  The invocation of contagion in these records appears to have provided a  
  meaningful analogy for the authors to use to describe the phenomenon and  
  underscore their high degree of concern. However, unlike “clustering,” which  
  describes proximity in time, spatial arrangement, or both, contagion implicates  
  some type of “contact” mechanism though which a disease is spread. Guided by  
  this presumption, authors who use clustering to infer contagion point to proximity  
  as their evidence; in essence, it becomes a circular argument (i.e., closely  
  occurring events, however defined, must be related and thus there must be  
  contagion). […] Therefore, using contagion as equivalent to cluster is not robust  
  heuristically—that is, it does not open doors that could lead to new research—and  
  inadvertently, it may have constrained research by not encouraging investigators  
  to more deeply explore the phenomenon. p. 3 
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After these critiques of contagion as it appears in contemporary suicide research, Cheng et al. 
eventually examine contagion’s force as a metaphor, concluding that “[w]hen applied as a 
descriptive metaphor, to say that the apparent spread of suicidal behaviors among persons or 
populations is a ‘contagion,’ its use has illustrative and frightening power” (p. 8). In light of 
these critiques, how can we understand how virulent frameworks of recomposition appear as a 
likely basis both for believing that composition poses a risk on par with contagion and for 
conveying risks of contagion as a convincing reason for writers to change their future 
compositions? 
  In framing the reporting of suicide as a potential contagion rather than simply a potential 
source for misinformation, NIMH and the CDC in effect reformulate suicide reportage as a 
disease, the act of reporting as a transmissive event, and the reporters themselves as risk-bearing 
carriers. For Priscilla Wald (2008), communicable disease illustrates “the logic of social 
responsibility: the mandate to live with a consciousness of the effects of one’s actions on others” 
and “the possibility of constituting a threat to others” (p. 22). Grounded in this kind of ethical 
stance, NIMH instructs news writers to avoid an epidemic of suicide contagion in two ways: by 
not participating in the spread of the contagion through explicit descriptions of methods, 
dramatic headlines or images, or extensive coverage that glamorizes death; and by avoiding the 
language of communicable disease in which NIMH itself, ironically, has engaged. Though 
NIMH opens with the statement that “[s]uicide is a public health issue” and calls suicide 
“contagious,” it also specifically advises media reporters against using epidemiological terms to 
denote statistical increases in reported suicides35; instead of “[d]escribing recent suicides as an 
‘epidemic,’ ‘skyrocketing,’ or other strong terms,’” reporters should “[c]arefully investigate the 
most recent CDC data and use non-sensational words like ‘rise’ or ‘higher.’” Thus, NIMH 
  90 
engages in fine-grained linguistic parsing, openly identifying suicide as a “public health issue” 
and a “contagion” but warning that it not be publicly called an “epidemic.” Reporters are not 
only to avoid spreading the contagion by escalating the terms of depiction but also to avoid 
suggesting to their consumers that there could be a spreading contagion. In this construction of 
suicide, containment and prevention are matters of rhetorical restraint. 
  Terming suicide “contagion” and, further, a “public health issue” frames it 
metaphorically as the effect of a disease upon a body, as something that may infiltrate and 
damage a public body rather than as the act a person resolves upon and takes with his or her own 
body. With suicide as contagion, individuals completing suicide cease to be actors 
consummating an act. The rhetorical presentation of suicide as contagion is not a human decision 
but an effect of the disease. Framing suicide as contagious removes agency from individuals, as 
in general I have noted that viral metaphors do. 
Metaphorical Entailments and the Beneficiaries of Sponsorship 
  The examples of NIMH and the CDC sponsoring writing guidelines that engage in in 
metaphors of viral spread and attempt to intervene in that spread present us with a culmination of 
metaphorical entailments that simultaneously reinforce and contract one another. For example, 
while clementine cannibal may work to eclipse her sponsorship of grrrlVIRUS by framing the 
movement as infectious, and therefore spreading of its own agency, metaphors of virulence also 
portray textual consumers as acted upon by an external power, much as the metaphor of 
sponsorship does. Underlying this is the implication that there are others whose ideas, if not 
interests, are acting upon us through our interactions. What of this distinction between ideas and 
interests? In Chapter Three, I pushed on the entailment of interestedness within the metaphor of 
sponsorship, as sponsors, by definition, gain something from their actions. I argue here that 
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NIMH and CDC understandings of compositions as contagions and their goals of promoting and 
obstructing specific messages that reporters and bloggers might spread to larger publics may 
raise further questions about the interests literacy sponsorship fulfills.  
  In the examples of NIMH’s and the CDC’s sponsorship, the principal appears to be the 
audience itself. NIMH and the CDC sponsor messages they judge to serve the public’s best 
interest. In this case, this includes members of the public who are difficult to identify and locate, 
populations potentially vulnerable to suicide ideation. In their reading of Foucault’s Security, 
Territory, Population, Livingston and Puar (2011) argue that the classification of humans as a 
biological species allowed for the synecdochic logic36 that the life and futurity of a human body 
represented the interests of the life and futurity of the human population. Thus, in sponsoring 
messages of interests to a potentially vulnerable population, NIMH and the CDC are also 
sponsoring messages for the good of the population as a whole. While, in this way, the audience 
is the principal, the medical institutions recruiting reporters and digital writers to mediate these 
messages to wider audiences are arguably principals as well, in that it is their responsibility to 
promote and maintain public health. The vagaries of principalship at play here extend as well to 
sponsorship. If sponsors, by definition, gain something from their activities, how do we 
understand sponsors like NIMH and the CDC who seek gains not for themselves but for others? 
Is this simply an issue of multiple parties occupying the role of principal, or does it press upon 
our notions of sponsorship as operating economically? If sponsorship does in fact operate 
economically, how do we account for not only sponsors and sponsored writers but also for the 
ultimate beneficiaries, the consumers of sponsored texts?  
  We might first try turning to Selfe and Hawisher’s (2004) term benefactor, used in 
examples in which the actor providing access to literacy does not gain anything in return. 
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However, because NIMH and the CDC use other writers in order to reach the consumers they 
intend to help, I do not find this framework fitting for these examples.  
  In light of these examples, I argue that just as the role of speaker actually covers a variety 
of roles of authors, animators, and principals (Goffman 1981), so too is sponsor a multilayered 
term that we must unpack in order to understand who is acting and who is benefiting within this 
system, one traditionally understood as operating economically. The writers of these 
recommendations, for example, are actually reanimating messages of numerous authors’ 
scholarly works. Thus, the apparent sponsors are themselves animators of other authors’ 
arguments, even as they ask others to further animate their guidelines for spreading their own 
messages and stifling competing messages. 
  Furthermore, these sponsors ask their audience to take up the roles of social actors even 
as they portray their animators’ readers as passive recipients acted upon by the content of the 
texts they consume. As I move forward, I ask how we might more explicitly recognize the 
importance of audience participation and agency in recomposition. Because recomposition 
requires not only the communication from a speaker to a passive audience to but an audience that 
further circulates the message, it requires not only a speaker successfully convincing the 
audience of his or her composition’s value but also an audience acting beyond receiving or even 
appreciating the content. How can we articulate these activities and roles to overcome the 
shortcomings of sponsorship, viruses, and conduits as metaphors for recomposition?  
                                                
33 In fact, Davidson and Gould’s explanation of degrees of virulence does not even frame the reporting of death of a 
classmate as virulent so much as the actual death itself. 
 
34 Becker et al. (2004) and Stack (2003) examine influences of suicide instruction, with Becker et al. documenting 
the story of Lisa searching for suicide methods on suicide forums online, while Stack observes that, in the year Final 
Exit, a guide for suicide for terminally ill persons recommending asphyxiation as a means of suicide, the number of 
suicides by asphyxiation in New York City rose by 313% with the book found at the scene of 27% of those suicides 
(p. 238).  
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35 In “Instead of This” and “Do This” 
 
36 This is not a term not from their text but one that I use to capture the phenomenon they discuss. 	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Chapter Five 
Conclusion: Integrating Multiple Metaphors of Literate Activity 
   
   This chapter asks how we can overcome the shortcomings this project has outlined in 
notions of sponsorship, viruses, and conduits as metaphors for recomposition. I suggest, as a 
jumping off point, Spiro et al.’s (1989) argument that, although analogies are an important tool in 
communicating, conceptualizing, and acquiring understanding, their reduction of complex 
concepts to similar and more familiar analogical cores can make them serious impediments to 
fuller and more precise understandings of the phenomena they portray, often resulting in 
erroneous knowledge. Spiro et al. posit two remedies to this problem of what should be done to 
counter the tendencies toward oversimplification that come with the use of analogy and lead to 
misconceptions (p. 514): 1) paying more attention to the ways that analogies fail, mislead, or are 
incomplete and 2) employing integrated multiple analogies to convey more of the necessary 
complexity of difficult concepts or employing several already known concepts rather than only 
one (p. 499). They explain that, in the case of integrating multiple analogies, there are two main 
ways of adding new analogies to earlier analogies: modified analogies, in which new analogies 
merely emend an earlier ones, and new analogies, in which totally new analogies are added (p. 
521).  
 Up to this point, I have primarily worked to revise the vertical character of the 
sponsorship metaphor in two ways. In Chapter Two, I worked within the framework and 
terminology of sponsorship through the lenses of confluent and composite sponsorships, which 
demonstrate that the intersection of sponsors can be simultaneously horizontal—as multiple 
sponsors collide and co-operate—and vertical—as one may, in some respects, actually sponsor 
the other. In Chapters Three and Four, I examined more horizontally oriented metaphors of viral 
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and memetic spread, specifically focusing on sponsors recruiting writers to “infect” others or 
prevent “contagion” through the spread of texts. Interestingly, however, both the vertical and 
horizontal metaphorical frameworks portray writers, text sharers, and readers as acted upon, 
afflicted, or otherwise interpellated, not accounting for their agency in composing, spreading, or 
ascribing value to the texts with which they interact. At this point then, I shift my focus from the 
ways the analogies discussed throughout this dissertation fail, mislead, or operate incompletely 
and working to modify them and on to exploring how me might integrate multiple analogies in 
order to mitigate the gaps or misrepresentations the individuals metaphors on their own might 
entail. Like Spiro et al., I do not advocate complication for its own sake (p. 501). I propose 
intervening in these analogies in an effort to integrate frameworks that more effectively capture 
the activity of writers, whether identified as sponsored or patient zeros. Though I have used the 
term sponsored writers for my work, I recognize that this term identifies these writers primarily 
based on the activity, influence, and agency of another. The fact that we have no terminology for 
discussing the agency of individuals who feature in the literate activity related to sponsorship, 
but not as the sponsors, should concern us as scholars, as we implicitly deny them roles as social 
actors through such conceptualization.  
  In earlier chapters, I worked to mitigate this passivization of textual participants, 
highlighting how we might understand affiliates of Babeland on Facebook as recruiting their 
sponsors into their social goals in Chapter Two and using Goffman’s (1981) production format in 
chapters Three and Four to articulate how sponsored writers in networks of recomposition and 
regulated composition are engaged in rhetorical acts of animation and principalship at least (and 
often are also engaged in authoring). I offer this chapter as further recovery and reclamation of 
the activity and agency of those participating in networks of discourse. Because recomposition 
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requires not simply the communication from a speaker to a passive audience, but an audience 
that acts to further circulate the message, it requires not only a speaker successfully convincing 
the audience of his or her composition’s value but an audience acting, taking rhetorically 
motivated action (even if it be as simple as clicking a button that adds their name to a petition or 
that retweets without comment another’s texts) that goes beyond receiving or even appreciating 
the content. The remainder of this project works to explicitly recognize the importance of these 
particular forms of audience participation and agency in recomposition. 
  Although I have argued that common frameworks for conceptualizing processes of 
recomposition obscure activities and dynamic social relations, it is important to recognize that 
other models for understanding exist in scholarship. In Chapter Three, for example, I built upon 
not only Goffman but also LeFevre’s (1987) examination of the varied social grounds of 
invention and Lasswell’s (1959) work on innovation as a social process to illuminate the agency 
and collaborative processes potentially obscured by researching popular circulation in terms of 
an index case, or a patient zero, as a site of infection rather than as a composer of content. While 
LeFevre’s framework of invention as a social act helps to frame sponsored writers as agents 
working within networks of other social actors, I am interested in further articulating the multiple 
social relations of sponsors and sponsored writers in both distinct and overlapping social roles. 
To these ends, I take up, as LeFevre did, Lasswell’s metaphors of resonance and dampening but 
also Kawachi’s (2008) study of spreading and stifling to explore how we might legibilize the 
roles sponsored writers play as social actors. While Goffman’s terminology productively 
captures the agency of animators articulating the authored messages and principalship of others, 
his models are grounded in face-to-face interaction rather than larger scaled, mediated 
interactions. He does not explore how people shut down or silence others or even how they co-
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opt others words and ideologies. Lasswell and Kawachi illustrate actors engaging in more 
specific activities of encouraging or derailing specific texts and interests, acting metaphorically 
as resonators and spreaders or dampers and stiflers. In the following section, I examine how 
these frameworks can serve as additional metaphors to inform and flesh out Goffman’s concept 
of animation for a more nuanced understanding of actors mediating others’ messages.  
Unpacking Animation: Resonance, Spreading, Dampening, and Stifling 
  The body of this dissertation examined examples of individuals distributing other 
composers’ interests, ideas, and even exact compositions, such as Babeland’s revised prompts, 
Alex’s exact photo, the Philosoraptor design, as well as writing prompts and guidelines in which 
sponsors sought just that, such as clementine cannibal’s call for grrrlVIRUS flyers and NIMH 
suggesting that reporters use the information from its guidelines to write safely about suicide.  
Similarly, Lasswell advises that when we focus intensively upon the innovative process in any 
social setting, we become aware of the phenomena of resonators and dampers. He proposes that 
successful innovators set up resonant relationships with individuals in their social environments, 
while potentially significant innovators may often be stunted through lack of a lack of 
connections playing a resonating role and through dependence upon an environment exerting a 
dampening influence (p. 216). While Brandt (1998, 2001) includes productive and 
counterproductive influences within the framework of sponsorship, with sponsors capable of 
enabling and constraining, Lasswell isolates resonating and dampening influences. My work has 
focused on examples of resonance. LeFevre (1987) elaborates on Lasswell’s work to explain that 
“[r]esonance comes about when an individual act—a ‘vibration’—is intensified and prolonged 
by sympathetic vibrations […] it requires the participation of real people” (p. 65). We see this 
resonance and amplification in examples such as the fan girls popularizing #AlexFromTarget and 
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grrrls spreading grrrlVIRUS, as animators both disperse and temporally prolong what could 
easily have been compositional blips if not picked up by the radars of audiences with shared or 
sympathetic interests and then retransmitted to their audiences. These layered chains of 
audiences not only consumed texts in question but further sustained the interests behind them by 
repeating them across both digital and physical spaces. Both Lasswell’s focus on creators and 
LeFevre’s on inventors can be informed by Goffman’s separation of author and principal. For 
example, the grrrls copying or modeling texts after clementine cannibal’s are not only resonating 
the work of an author but furthering the interests of multiple principals in promoting cannibal’s 
interests and those they recognize as helping women in general.  
  Similar to Lasswell’s concept of resonators and dampers is Kawachi’s (2008) portrayal of 
spreaders and stiflers in relation to spreading rumors. In his mathematical model of rumor 
transmission, Kawachi identifies two social roles outside of the spreaders actively spreading the 
rumor: susceptibles, those do not know about the rumor, and stiflers, who know about the rumor 
and do not spread it (p. 1990). He notes that although susceptibles can change their rumor-class 
and become spreaders, they may doubt the rumor’s credibility and consequently become stiflers 
(p. 1990). As such, Kawachi differentiates the roles of individuals not actively spreading content 
because they are unfamiliar with it and those who are familiar with it but choose actively not to 
spread it. What he does not clarify is the role of individuals actively combatting the content. This 
results in two facets of the framework not yet fully explored. For example, a person may not only 
lack interest in or not lend enough credence to gossip to pass it on, but may actively defend the 
object of gossip or refute a rumor as false. I find this distinction important because Kawachi’s 
framework also does not consider that refuting a rumor or critiquing the content of another type 
of message may further spread it in some ways by raising it in people’s consciousness. Notions 
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such as spreading and stifling may provide us with intellectual space for considering processes of 
a sort of anti-animation but also restrict our understandings to a binary that ignores that activities 
may simultaneously spread and stifle a message. In the following section, I consider how we 
might conceptualize such activities of spreading and stifling as potentially multipart to capture 
such overlapping action.   
Beyond Binaries: A Rhizomatic View of Recomposition 
  I argue that animation may function through one or many activities related to spreading 
and stifling that are not situated on a clear-cut continuum between spreaders and stiflers as 
dichotomies but in a more rhizomatic organization in which various roles and effects may 
overlap (see Figure 5.1).  
 
Figure 5.1 
The activities and roles I provide as examples are neither exhaustive nor mutually exclusive. The 
terms I employ are not discrete categories, as animators may take up more than one at a time, and 
the lines between them are not clear-cut. I offer these terms not as a distinctive model of 
animation, authorship, and principalship but as an invitation to examine the complexity of 
activities that may simultaneously spread a text while acting against the interests of its principal, 
incidentally or intentionally.  
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 For example, animators may operate as copiers, directly reproducing a text with no 
alterations. Examples would include writing out a quote word for word or photocopying an 
image. A copier may then also move on to be a spreader by retweeting; sharing on Facebook; or 
forwarding an email. Copiers help to illuminate how texts’ contexts can be multiple. In her study 
of memetics, Shifman (2013) suggests that, in the digital age, “people do not have to repackage 
memes: They can spread content as is by forwarding, linking, or copying”, (p. 365) while Kumar 
(2015) observes that “[s]ince replication is also mutation and the iteration cannot share the 
presence in time and space of the original, memetic repetition in new sites, through new bodies 
and in new contexts both disturbs the original and displaces it by being ‘almost the same but not 
quite’” (p. 234). In more concrete terms, the copier may place the text in a new context by virtue 
of publishing it in a new space for a new audience without altering the contexts such as captions 
explaining an image, quote, or news story. I might do this, for example, to pass along news of an 
event happening on my university campus without comment (though my audience’s experience 
with my personal history could obviously color their perception of whether I intended the 
mention promotionally). As Shifman further observes, “a quick look at any Web 2.0 application 
would reveal that people do choose to create their own versions of Internet memes” through 
repackaging strategies of mimicry and remixing (p. 365), which leads me to consider a number 
of roles beyond direct copying. 
  Animators (re-animators) may also act as diffusers, spreading a message thinly, in a way 
that might not capture its pith. This could include paraphrasing or slightly re-centering a text, 
such as sharing a news story captioned with a message about a portion most relevant to his 
interests, sharing an image with a photo about how it reminds her of something not directly 
related to the context of the image; or sharing a quote with a note about what it means to her.
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 Animators can act as imitators, mimicking a text (see Figure 5.2 of Anna and Lexie 
Faith of impersonating Elsa and Anna from Disney’s Frozen [Official Anna Faith Page]), thus 
spreading its concept, though not its exact composition or craftsmanship.  
 
 
Figure 5.2 
  Some animators act as appropriators, taking an author’s work and fitting it for an 
alternate purpose. 4Chan’s appropriation of Lonely Dinosaur’s T-shirt design in the creation of 
the template for the Philosoraptor macro stands out as an example from this dissertation. While 
still circulating a version of the text, appropriators’ activities may shift the resulting text from the 
interests of the principal. Appropriators may also be satirists, though satire may not simply 
appropriate a message but further disrupt it and the interests behind it; advocate for revisions to 
it; or explicitly express dissent against it. 
 As such, animators may act as disrupters, derailing a message intentionally or 
unintentionally.  
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  They may work as revisionists, striving to specifically change or improve a message. 
Like appropriators, revisionists may circulate the message without continuing to serve its 
principal. A fictional examination that comes to mind is that of Thank You for Smoking (Reitman 
2005), in which Senator Finistirre proposes that movies featuring smoking be "improved" by 
removing cigarettes and replacing them with less offensive objects:  
  
  Interviewer: What do you say to the people who claim you are destroying cinema  
  classics? 
 
  Senator: Mmm, no. All we're doing is using digital technology to tastefully update  
  movies of the past...by removing cigarettes. I believe that if these stars were alive  
  today, they would agree that we're doing the right thing.    
 
  Interviewer: But, in essence, aren't you changing history?    
  
  Senator: No, I think we're improving history.   
 
  Animators (re-animators) may operate as dissidents, actively combating a text, and yet 
even while acting against the interests of the principal, dissidents are still circulating a 
representation of the material by voicing discussion (the expression “there is no such thing as 
bad press” comes to mind). 
  In some cases, animation may move to anti-animation as people act as censors, 
obstructing part or all of a message from being spread. While revisionists alter and spread a 
message, censors block others from seeing all or part of it, as exemplified through redactions of 
circulated texts; banning material from circulating; or removing content from a forum.  
 It is important to note that active spreaders can play into stifling by bringing content to 
the attention of would-be stiflers; causing enough attention to make the ideas worth stifling; or 
presenting, appropriating, or revising the material in a way that incites stiflers. For example, 
consider fans circulating literature and films to the point at which they are well-known enough 
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for schools and even legal systems to ban their consumption. Fan fiction, art, and videos may 
circulate fictional characters and universes, but the changes that their composers make to 
characters and plot lines can lead copyright holders to seek to censor them.37 Stifling can also 
inadvertently lead to spread, as banning books and films can make can cause both discussion and 
rebellion that lead some to seek them out. Thus, it is essential not to reduce spreading and stifling 
to simple oppositions, but to recognize them as activities that are dynamic and complex with 
repercussions potentially contradictory to their terminology or the intent(s) behind them. 
Spreading and stifling can work produce unexpected patterns of temporal and spatial effects.  
Sponsorship, Virality, and Recomposition: A Multiple Metaphors Approach 
  Spiro et al. (1989) propose selecting a set of analogies so that each analogy might modify, 
cancel out, and/or correct the negative, unproductive aspects of one or more of the other 
analogies, such as missing, misleading, or poorly focused information (pp. 520-521). Within the 
context of this project, I similarly contend that virality helps to challenge sponsorship as defined 
by vertical hierarchy rather than horizontal connections, while sponsorship helps to characterize 
individuals, institutions, and infrastructures, not simply ideas themselves, as acting upon writers 
and readers. While the integration of these metaphors can helps us in the field of writing studies 
to consider how each metaphor alone may limit its users’ understandings of how they and others 
interact through writing, it is worth noting that Spiro et al.’s work is not aimed at revising the 
theoretical understandings of a subject matter at large. As Spiro et al. examine how metaphors 
for how the human heart works can limit students’ understanding of the organ by reducing its 
complexity, they propose adjusting pedagogical practices to provide students with multiple 
metaphors to overcome the limitations of traditional education analogies within their specific 
field. Though they identify their suggested set of multiple analogies as interlocking, their 
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explanation of implementing multiple metaphors highlights the salience and applicability of 
specific metaphors within the set in specific contexts of practice. They explain, for example, that 
“in contexts where it is important to focus on the way muscle fiber is affected by longer lengths 
and length limitations, the Chinese finger cuffs image would become salient; when thinking is 
directed at muscle functioning under short lengths and toward the limits to shortening, the 
turnbuckle image would be ‘programmed’ for high salience” (p. 522). While their study focuses 
specifically on instructional metaphors in the context of an educational setting, this dissertation 
has worked to show how the metaphors that shape our understandings of writing come from a 
number of sources that might be impossible to anticipate.  
  Spiro et al.’s proposed system of multiple metaphors potentially helps to reflect multiple 
realities so that fewer are occluded. In the last section, I suggested that metaphors of sponsorship 
and virality need to be complemented with metaphors that focus on the roles people play in 
spreading, stifling, using, and reusing the texts they’re engaging with.  Other metaphors may also 
be useful. For example, none of these metaphors really explore systematic structural effects on 
how messages get spread or don’t. Another metaphor that might be useful in this sense, playing 
on biological accounts of natural selection, would be a notion of rhetorical selection. In the 
metaphor of rhetorical selection, certain features of texts (e.g., file type, platform, linguistic 
characteristics, metadata, etc.) would make a text more or less likely to replicate in the system, 
just as features of the system (e.g., major events in the world) would affect replication. Of course, 
it is also worth noting potential risks of the entailments (again, erasure of agency, possible ad 
hoc accounts of why texts have gone viral, confusion of survival and replication with ethical or 
rhetorical value). Nevertheless, adding this metaphor to the mix illuminates, as does each 
metaphor, certain processes in the phenomena of recomposition.  
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Implications for Writers 
 While we can extend LeFevre’s, Goffman’s, Lasswell’s, and Kawachi’s theoretical 
frameworks to understand that that spread, like viral metaphors, cannot work when writers are 
isolated in metaphorical quarantine, these researchers’ work also suggests that recomposition 
requires more than bodies to infect; not just anyone will work as a “host,” as principals require 
audiences with power—authors and animators with access to audiences of their own—to spread 
their interests. Lasswell’s and Goffman’s work both demonstrate the role and even importance of 
social linkages (Lasswell) in circulating content. Identifying these connections, their agency, and 
the resources and responsibility they bring is really essential. As Jenkins et al. (2013) expound, 
“An attempt to create a “viral” video will be informed by what one knows about viruses [….] On 
the other hand, a creator of a “spreadable” video will be drawing upon an entirely different body 
of knowledge, perhaps a theory about why people gossip, or the related theory of social capital” 
(p. 22). This sharing of interests in gossip and social capital is what we see in #Alex and such, 
and these alignments of interests are an important part of what works within a sponsoring 
technology such as Twitter; if people don’t want to talk about it, all of the technological 
affordances in creation do not make them do it—writers need for audience awareness to meet 
audience needs, though those needs might not be apparent.  
  Despite this, Google returns millions of hits regarding advice for producing viral content:  
  “how to write a viral tweet”: About 1,240,000 results 
  “how to write viral content”: About 12,000,000 results 
“how to make a blog go viral”: 32,700,000 results 
   “how do you make a post go viral” [within the context of Facebook]: 42,600,000 results 
These results suggest that metaphoric conceptual tools for understanding recomposition affect 
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not only how scholars understand and represent writing, but how lay people approach writing 
practices. For example, Green and Jenkins (2011) observe that:  
  [m]ajor commercial producers are having trouble adjusting their economic models to take  
  advantage of alternatives to broadcast distribution, because they don’t know how to value  
  the work audiences perform when they are not simply “consuming” content. No wonder,  
  talk of the media viruses has been embraced by professional media producers—it  
  preserves the illusion that they can master some arcane process and design a self- 
  propagating consumable. But the term’s popularity indicates corporate struggles to  
  understand the new roles audiences perform within the dynamic networks of distribution  
  and circulation. (p. 122) 
Writers seeking to spread something need to understand their audiences as making decisions 
about what to ascribe value to and pass on; it is the audience’s agency, its ability to pass on, 
praise, decry, or ignore a text that rhetors need to cater to, rather than an imagined agency within 
a given text itself. Seeing the agency of sponsored writers or participants in “viral” textual 
phenomena is not simply an exercise in theory but a necessary step in the goal for goals of 
promoting recomposition.  
Implications for Studies of Literacy Sponsorship 
 In my critique of the imaginary of a patient zero in compositional outbreak narratives in 
Chapter Three, I recounted Lasswell’s and LeFevre’s claims that individualistic notions of 
authors and Platonic views of invention cause us to often identify a sole author or invention, a 
sole origin, rather than a series of interactive processes between collaborators. This project 
entreats future theory and research on recomposition to fight (potentially unconscious) pressure 
to focus on a single point of origin (or a hierarchical pressure of origin) and instead focus on how 
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writers consistently pull from other works and contexts that make certain texts and messages ripe 
for selection in appealing to aligned audiences interests. As such, this project joins conversations 
of literate activity as situated, mediated, and dispersed (Brandt 1990; Prior 1998, 2004; Prior and 
Shipka 2003). For example, this dissertation has demonstrated the importance of such a focus in 
identifying both explicit collaboration as well constellations of producers unrelated except for the 
same cultural capital from which they both pull. Reiff and Page collaborated directly as Page 
created an immediate context for Reiff’s photo of Alex, while their production took off because 
it pulled from a much larger context of teenage girls constructing fandoms around boys their age 
styled like music icons such as Justin Bieber or the boys from 5 Seconds of Summer. Both 
Lonely Dinosaur and the designer of the Philosoraptor holding Plato’s works built on Jurassic 
Park’s velociraptor image and fan community, though only Lonely Dinosaur’s design, 
surrounded by negative space, lent itself to selection and appropriation as a template written text, 
allowing for a very specific form of participation that the Plato Philosoraptor did not 
accommodate.  
  The work of emending the multiple and complex metaphors interrogated throughout this 
project is certainly not exhausted by the work of this dissertation, which has raised many 
questions I have not yet answered. As we continue to identify limitations within our methods for 
understanding and teaching writing, I see a great deal of room for future studies in locating 
agency within various acts of facilitating and inhibiting recomposition in ways that will force us 
to question the entailments we intend our metaphors to signify. The concepts of dampers and 
stiflers discussed here not only help us to identify forces of recomposition that we might not 
otherwise account for in potentially undermining spread but also may challenge the very 
definition of sponsorship. While Brandt identifies sponsors as gaining advantage from their 
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activity in some way  (1998, p. 166; 2001, p. 19), Lasswell’s view of dampers and Kawachi’s 
observation of stiflers might potentially lead us to complicate the anticipation of such gains. Do 
sponsors always gain something from their activities? Might they sometimes fail to gain what 
they seek? Does our current framework of sponsorship assume that both the sponsors’ gain and 
the sponsored writers’ access to literacy are inevitable within the processes of literacy 
sponsorship? Are there domains of gain (e.g., in identity work, aesthetic sense, humor) that have 
little or nothing to do with economic gain? 
  Brandt (2015) recently identified herself as perplexed at how the concept of sponsorship 
has been taken up in writing studies and education over the years and turned into a more benign 
concept than she had imagined it (p. 330). She emphasizes the most important phrase of her 
definition of literacy sponsorship as “gaining advantage [of their sponsorship] in some way,” a 
concept she sees as frequently deleted or downplayed by other researchers (pp. 330-331). She 
reiterates, “Sponsors are entities who need our literacy as much or more than we do. They are 
investors, cultivators, exploiters, proselytizers, innovators, and they are in competition with other 
sponsors for the formidable powers and benefits that can come their way via our literacy” (p. 
331). She further emphasizes that  “not all influences and benefactors would qualify as sponsors 
of literacy. Sponsors of literacy incorporate our skills into their projects, and the value and reach 
of our skills come to depend on the viability and durability of those projects. This dependency is 
what exposes literacy to so much turbulence, makes it so fragile and contingent” (p. 331). 
Although Brandt argues for a more specific and limited sense of the term, sponsorship does not 
simply have top-down effects, as sponsorship, by definition, is an exchange. In fact, I find 
Brandt’s last point of dependency of particular interest in the examples of sponsors within this 
dissertation who seek to help others. I indicated before that I did not find Selfe and Hawisher’s 
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(2004) term benefactor fitting for NIMH and the CDC because they use other writers in order to 
reach the consumers they intend to help. NIMH and the CDC are not necessarily seeking to help 
their sponsored writers directly but those writers’ readers, and as such, they rely on writers to 
take up the scripts they model. If the gains that NIMH and the CDC seek are for others, and not 
simply for institutions themselves, does this complicate sponsorship as it is currently theorized? 
Certainly, both institutions seek to achieve their own goals, but is it significant that these goals 
are partly in the interests of helping others? 
 As Brandt (2105) has criticized, the field has taken up the notion of sponsorship in a 
wider sense than she had intended. Goldblatt and Jolliffe (2014) argue the last phrase of Brandt’s 
definition has always bothered them as incomplete and overstated, that "gain advantage" does 
not exhaust the story of sponsorship because sponsors take risks; they “can be harmed, altered, or 
even transformed by the population and pedagogy they contract to teach” (p. 127). Scholars such 
as Cushman (2014) and Moss and Lyons-Robinson (2014) have framed sponsors’ dependency on 
their readers and writers in such a way as to call the hierarchical relationship between the 
sponsor and sponsored into question by observing how sponsors often require the consent of 
those sponsored. In her study of the Cherokee Phoenix, the first newspaper published by an 
Indian tribe in the United States, Cushman works to add nuance to the notion of sponsorship by 
examining how sponsors are beholden to those sponsored by their efforts and to those who put 
them in the position to sponsor in the first place (p. 27). In their study of an African American 
women’s group, Moss and Lyons-Robinson extend of the role of the literacy sponsor to 
protecting the vision of the sponsored, who, they argue, can actually set the agenda and terms of 
access (p. 142). 
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 As these scholars continue to theorize the notion of sponsorship and the power relations it 
entails, others have tweaked the term sponsorship itself to consider situations in which the 
economics of labor between sponsor and sponsored do not fit Brandt’s description of sponsors 
gaining advantage through their interactions. Teasing out the subtleties between individual 
agency and the agendas of invested sponsors, Alanna Frost (2011) shifts her terminology and 
conceptual framework from sponsorship to stewardship, proposing that literacy steward “can be 
applied to any individual who demonstrates persistent dedication to the practice or promotion of 
a literacy considered traditionally important to his or her community. The traditional literacy that 
a steward engages is notably alternative to those that are institutionally and economically 
dominant” (p. 56). 
 Few, however, have reworked the terminology to recover the agency on the part of 
recipients or “objects” of literacy sponsorship as this dissertation has aimed to do. MacDonald 
(2015) has made inroads here, introducing the term emissaries of literacy to identify agents who 
participate actively in reworking their relationship to English literacy education, which he 
proposes as a complement to the figure of the literacy sponsor and as recognition of the work of 
those “who are the perceived objects of sponsorship” (p. 410). While MacDonald’s term may 
potentially struggle to gain traction outside of his research’s context in studying refugees, I see 
his work as a vital entreaty to literacy scholars to not simply acknowledge the agency of 
sponsored writers but to discuss them in terminology that identifies them by their activities, and 
not simply by how they are acted upon.  
  Of course, many recent publications on literacy sponsorship do not necessarily re-
theorize, or deal in detail with, the notion of sponsorship itself so much as invoke sponsors of 
literacy to unpack studies as varied as transnational booksellers’ roles in shaping print culture in 
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Asian culture (Bohley 2010); the literacy work of the social-settlement movement in the United 
States (Fehler 2010); the unprofessed non-literacy goals of the Post-9/11 GI Bill (Lebduska 
2014); and the role of the 4-H movement on children’s everyday information creation practices 
in the Progressive Era (Trace 2014). In reviewing such studies of literacy sponsors, I get the 
sense that the term sponsorship itself indicates a relationship in which sponsors not only have 
something to give to those they sponsor but actually do give it to them. Is there room in this 
framework for understanding those who offer resources that are not taken up? For example, does 
our understanding of NIMH and the CDC’s prompting and modeling of composition change if 
writers do not take up their guidelines? We see in Dewey’s (2014) reporting on Robin Williams’ 
death and social network users’ response to it that these concerns have reached at least some 
reporters, though we do not know if it was directly from the actual guidelines we discussed. 
Should it shift our understanding of the guidelines and the work they attempt if they are 
ultimately ignored? 
   I raise these questions to stress that, in attempting a multiple metaphors approach to 
understanding sponsorship, it is vital that we not simply add new metaphors and stir but 
genuinely take the time to understand the metaphors we currently employ in order to recognize 
their limitations of use. As I have argued throughout this project, these conceptual frameworks 
are not simply a tool for explaining textual phenomena but actually shape writing practices. 
While this project has focused on literate activity outside of explicit educational settings, whether 
academic or recreational, I hope that it will lead to future studies of not only the metaphors we 
employ in the classroom but also of what our educators’ roles are in teaching composition within 
the context of so many institutions, media reports, sponsoring practices, and slang terms also 
teaching writers and readers various meanings of what writing does, how it interacts with us, and 
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how we interact with each other through its mediation. This project comes as a reminder that 
academic instructors are but one of many sources of writing instruction and thus raises the 
question of where academic instruction fits within a much larger system of everyday recruiting 
and conceptualizing of writing practices.  
                                                
37 Jenkins (2006) discusses this specifically in discussion of the Star Wars franchise’s efforts to control fan 
productions. 
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